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GLOBALIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY
Bui Ngoc Son
Abstract:
This Article extends Gary J. Jacobsohn’s theory of
constitutional identity to better understand the dynamics of constitutional identity in
the era of globalization. The extended theoretical framework features the relation of
constitutional globalization to the change of national constitutional identity. Within
that framework, this Article offers an original, empirical examination of the case of
Vietnam and compares it with other socialist regimes (China, Laos, North Korea, and
Cuba). It argues that globalization induces adaption to the socialist constitutional
identity.
The socialist constitutional identity is adapted by the pragmatic
incorporation of fundamental ideas and principles of global constitutionalism.
Consequently, the essence of the socialist constitutional identity remains but is
modified and extended in the globalizing context. Although there is convergence in
the adaption to socialist constitutional identity among the five socialist countries due
to the impact of constitutional globalization, there are four divergent models which
these countries adopt to react to the global impact on their constitutional identity,
namely constitutional globalism (Vietnam and Laos); constitutional exceptionalism
(China); constitutional isolationism (North Korea); and constitutional reservationism
(Cuba). This Article contributes to the scholarship on constitutional globalization,
comparative theory on constitutional identity, and empirical knowledge on
constitutional dynamics in the contemporary socialist world.

INTRODUCTION
The world is globalizing constitutionally. Professor Sarah H.
Cleveland describes the U.S. Constitution as an “international
constitution” in the sense that the U.S. Supreme Court cites international
sources in its constitutional interpretation.1 In a recent case, Obergefell v.
Hodges, Justice Anthony Kennedy of the U.S. Supreme Court cited
Confucius in his majority decision, interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment to uphold same sex marriage: “The centrality of marriage to
the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed
for millennia and across civilizations. . . . Confucius taught that marriage
lies at the foundation of government. 2 Li Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C.
Chai & W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. 1967).”2 Conversely, ideas of
American constitutionalism have been diffused into China. In a national


Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Asian Legal Studies, National University of Singapore
Faculty of Law; PhD, University of Hong Kong; Visiting Researcher, Harvard Law School (2012). I
am deeply grateful to Gary J. Jacobsohn for his constructive comments and suggestions. I greatly
appreciate Kevin Tan for his suggestions and inspiring conversations. For useful comments on early
drafts of this Article, I thank Henning Glaser, John Gillespie, Tom Ginsburg, Pip Nicholson, and
participants in the workshops What is Socialist About Socialist Law, and Identity and Change – The
Basic Structure in Asian Constitutional Orders. This Article also benefits from discussions with
Albert Chen, Weitseng Chen, Fu Hualing, Andrew Harding, Jaclyn Neo, Dan W. Puchniak, Cheryl
Saunders, Adrienne Stone, Arun Thiruvengadam, and Wang Jiangyu.
1
See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1
(2006).
2
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 3, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
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constitutional debate in 2013, Chinese pro-constitutionalists advocated
for the practice of American-style constitutionalism in China.3 Professor
Mark Tushnet argues that globalization of constitutional law is now
inevitable.4 Constitutional globalization affects not only the design of
constitutional rules and institutions. More fundamentally, it induces the
changes to constitutional identity. I call this phenomenon “globalization
of constitutional identity.” 5
Constitutional identity refers to constitutional ideas and principles
fundamental to a polity. It is a part of what Francis Fukuyama calls the
“shared mental models,” which he conceives as “critical in facilitating
large-scale collective action.”6 Nobel laureate Douglas North also states
that: “Ideas and ideologies matter, and institutions play a major role in
determining just how much they matter. Ideas and ideologies shape the
subjective mental constructs that individuals use to interpret the world
around them and make choices.”7 Constitutional identity shapes the
formulation of constitutional institutions and their practices. Therefore, a
study on constitutional identity change is crucial to understand the
possibilities and constraints of constitutional institutions and functional
changes to those institutions.
This study is connected to the growing scholarship on global
constitutional law and comparative constitutional theory.8 Several global
3

See Thomas E. Kellogg, Arguing Chinese Constitutionalism: The 2013 Constitutional Debate
and the "Urgency" of Political Reform, 11 U. Pa. ASIA L. REV. 337 (2016); Rogier Creemers, China's
Constitutionalism Debate: Content, Context and Implications, 74 CHINA J. 91 (2015).
4
See generally Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 VA. J.
INT'L L. 985 (2009).
5
Several related terms should be defined. In this study, the term “constitutional globalization”
is used to refer to the global expansion or diffusion of global constitutional ideas, norms, and
institutions. The term “global constitutionalism” is used interchangeably with the term “generic
constitutionalism” to refer to normative constitutional ideals associated with limited government which
have informed constitutional design and practice around the world.
6
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER 442 (2011).
7
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
111 (1990).
8
See generally VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA
(2010); David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1277 (2008); Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification,
Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J. 64 (2013); David S.
Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
762 (2012); Rosalind Dixon & Eric A Posner, The Limits of Constitutional Convergence, 11 CHINA J.
INT'L L. 399 (2011).
For purposes of this Article, I focus on the globalization of domestic constitutional law and put
aside the related issue of constitutionalization of the global order. For the latter, see AOIFE
O'DONOGHUE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISATION (2014); RULING THE WORLD:
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P.
Trachtman eds., 2009); TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN
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constitutional studies have been conducted by collecting quantitative data
for all available national constitutions during the last six decades and
employing methods of econometrics to test the predictions of global
constitutional diffusion. This is a significant contribution, given the
dearth of empirical and quantitative studies in constitutional scholarship.9
However, quantitative studies of global constitutional law must be
qualified. Case-studies are necessary to qualitatively understand the
causal effect of global constitutional diffusion. In addition, studies on
constitutional globalization focus mainly on the global spread of
constitutional rules and institutions. More fundamental is the global
spread of general ideas and principles of constitutionalism.
Five communist countries survived the collapse of the Soviet bloc,
namely China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam. Identifying
themselves as socialist countries, they have maintained distinctive
constitutional systems defined by fundamental constitutional principles
rooted in Marxist-Leninism and Soviet constitutional tradition. However,
during the post-Soviet era, the force of constitutional globalization has
compelled the socialist regimes to adapt their constitutional core. Even
the communist state which attempts to be a global constitutional outlier
by developing constitutional “characteristics”10 is not immune to the
impact of constitutional globalization.11
These socialist regimes have been largely ignored in comparative
constitutional inquiry, leading constitutional comparativists to lament that
comparative constitutional law focuses mainly on a limited set of
established liberal constitutional systems in North America and Europe,
as well as a few other states with similar institutional settings.12 In
addition to linguistic and cultural considerations,13 the marginalization of
socialist constitutional experiences stems from the epistemic assumption
MODELS (Nicholas Tsagourias ed., 2007); Symposium, Introduction-Global Constitutionalism from an
Interdisciplinary Perspective, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 385 (2009).
9
Sujit Choudhry, Method in Comparative Constitutional Law: A Comment on Law and
Versteeg, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2078, 2087 (2012).
10
See generally Larry Catá Backer & Keren Wang, The Emerging Structures of Socialist
Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics: Extra Judicial Detention and the Chinese
Constitutional Order, 23 PAC. RIM LAW & POL'Y J. 251 (2014).
11
Haig Patapan, Towards a Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism: On Universalism and
Particularism in Chinese Constitutionalism, 3 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 78 (2015).
12
RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 212 (2014); Sujit Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative
Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR
DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION? 8 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008); Cheryl
Saunders, Towards a Global Constitutional Gene Pool, 4 NAT’L TAIWAIN U. L. REV. 3 (2009).
13
See Vicki C. Jackson, Methodological Challenges in Comparative Constitutional Law, 28
PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 323 (2010).
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that the socialist countries have strictly adhered to socialist ideology
which restricts constitutional dynamics.
This may not enrich
comparative constitutional inquiry. As this study will illustrate, this
assumption is flawed. Constitutional dynamics in the contemporary
socialist world illustrate new aspects of constitutional law, especially the
globalization of constitutional law, which can enrich global constitutional
studies.
For example, socialist experiences suggest that formal
constitutional change processes operate as the platform for global/local
constitutional dialogue.
This study is built upon scholarship on constitutional identity.14
“‘Constitutional identity’ is an essentially contested concept as there is no
agreement over what it means or refers to.”15 Two different versions of
constitutional identity theory are developed by Gary J. Jacobsohn and
Michel Rosenfeld. While Jacobsohn—in his book Constitutional
Identity—is more concerned with the identity of the constitution,
Rosenfeld—in his book The Identity of Constitutional Subject—focuses
more on the identity of the people as the constitutional subject. This
Article focuses on the identity of the constitution, and therefore
Jacobsohn’s theory is more relevant. Jacobsohn explains constitutional
identity change as a dialogical process animated by the element of
disharmony. Although this theory provides useful tools to conceptualize
constitutional identity change, it is informed by liberal constitutional
experiences and must be extended to better understand the experience of
different constitutional settings.
The purposes of this article are therefore twofold: (1) to extend
Jacobsohn’s theory of constitutional identity; and (2) to apply the
extended theoretical framework to examine the causal effect of
constitutional globalization on the change of domestic constitutional
identity with specific reference to the cases of the contemporary
socialist/communist regimes.
Part I establishes the extended theoretical framework featuring the
relation of constitutional globalization to the change of national
constitutional identity. It defines constitutional identity as constitutional
14

See generally GARY J. JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (2010); MICHEL ROSENFELD,
THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT: SELFHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE, AND
COMMUNITY (2010); Michel Troper, Behind the Constitution? The Principle of Constitutional Identity
in France, in CONSTITUTIONAL TOPOGRAPHY: VALUES AND CONSTITUTIONS 187 (András Sajó &
Renata Uitz eds., 2010).
15
Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Identity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 756, 756 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
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ideas and principles fundamental to a polity and explains that the change
to constitutional identity is the consequence of the dialogical interaction
between global and local constitutional identities.
After a brief introduction of the features of socialist constitutional
identity in Part II, Parts III and IV apply the above framework to the
cases of the five socialist regimes. Globalization induces adaption to the
socialist constitutional identity. The socialist constitutional identity is
adapted by the pragmatic incorporation of fundamental ideas and
principles of global constitutionalism. Consequently, the essence of the
socialist constitutional identity remains, but is modified and extended in
the globalizing context.
Part III illustrates this argument using the case of Vietnam. This
case-study is based on original, empirical work: my interviews with
constitutional scholars, constitution-makers, members of the
Constitutional Amendment Committee, constitutional advisors for top
political leaders, Assembly deputies, and National Assembly officers.16
This primary work is combined with analysis of Vietnamese materials:
documents and statements of constitution-makers and political leaders,
and scholarly writings on Vietnamese constitutional issues.
Part IV turns to a comparative context. Although there is
convergence in the adaption of socialist constitutional identity among the
five socialist countries due to the impact of constitutional globalization,
there are four divergent models which these countries adopt to react to
the global impact on their constitutional identity, namely constitutional
globalism (Vietnam and Laos); constitutional exceptionalism (China);
constitutional isolationism (North Korea); and constitutional
reservationism (Cuba).
This Article makes three major contributions.
First, for
scholarship on constitutional globalization, it suggests that not only rules
and institutions, but constitutional identity is also globalized. Second,
this Article refines and extends the comparative theory of constitutional
identity by considering the dynamics of constitutional identity in nonconstitutionalist polities influenced by globalization, the disharmony
between national and global constitutionalism, and the non-judicial
mechanism of local and global constitutional dialogue which animates

16

Due to sensitive nature of the issue, most interviewees remained anonymous, but other details
are specified. When the footnotes are addressed as “Interviews” this indicates that the statements or
evidence were drawn over several interviews, which will not be specified.
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constitutional identity change. Third, it enriches general knowledge of
comparative constitutional law by examining socialist experiences.
I.

GLOBALIZATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY CHANGE
A.

Constitutional Identity

A commentator distinguishes two ideas of constitutional identity:
1) identity of the constitution, and 2) identity of the people as the
constitutional subjects.17 I will characterize the former as the thin
approach and the latter as the thick approach. In the American debate,
Rosenfeld represents the latter, while Jacobsohn represents the former.
Rosenfeld conceptualizes constitutional identity as identity of the
constitutional subject of the people, which is “immersed in complex and
ambiguous relations with other relevant identities; such as, national,
ethnic, religious, or cultural identity.”18
Rosenfeld offers a
philosophically sophisticated theory of constitutional subjects. However,
his theory has to grapple with a number of questions: Who constitutes the
people? Are the people really the constitutional subject? Who, in
particular, are the authors of authoritarian constitutions that are not
ordained by “we the people”? How does one distinguish the
constitutional identity of the people from their national, cultural,
religious, and moral identities? If constitutional identity collapses into
one or more of these identities, is it still a distinctive subject for
constitutional inquiry? For these confusing questions, this study does not
attempt to pursue the identity of the people as the constitutional subject.
Instead, my study adopts a thin approach, which focuses on
constitutional identity as presented in Jacobsohn’s work. This approach
avoids the confusing conceptual questions, and is useful for empirical
analysis. For Jacobsohn, constitutional identity refers to constitutional
goals, aspirations, and commitments that a political community pursues
which are normally codified in a national constitutional text.19 Therefore,
“[t]o establish the identity of a constitution, it obviously makes sense to
scrutinize carefully the text itself. This provides us with a documentary
transcript of how a particular group of framers provided for the
governance of their polity, and it often includes their aspirations for its
subsequent development.”20
Jacobsohn distinguishes generic and
17

José Luis Martí, Two Different Ideas of Constitutional Identity: Identity of the Constitution v.
Identity of the People, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 17
(Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivina eds., 2013).
18
Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049,
1049 (1995).
19
See generally JACOBSOHN, supra note 14.
20
Id. at 348.
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specific constitutional identity: “All constitutional polities represent a
blend of characteristics revealing what is particular to the constitutional
culture as well as what are widely viewed as common attributes of a
universal culture of constitutionalism.”21 Jacobsohn, however, focuses
more on specific constitutional identity.22
Jacobsohn argues that “the concept of constitutional identity
should be at the center of constitutional theory.”23 If so, constitutional
identity must be a distinctive concept. For this purpose, I submit that the
concept of constitutional identity must be distinctively constitutional so
that it can be distinguished from the concepts of national or cultural
identity. Moreover, the concept of constitutional identity must be
distinctively identitarian so that it can be distinguished from other
constitutional concepts like “unwritten constitution” or “living
originalism” which also concern deep constitutional principles.24
With that in mind, I define constitutional identity as constitutional
ideas and principles fundamental to a constitutional system. It is
characterized by the following features. First, constitutional identity is
about constitutional ideas and principles existing at the fundamental
level, resonating with what political scientists variably call “the ‘public
philosophies’, ‘public sentiments’, ‘deep core’- worldviews or
Weltanschauung that undergird the policies and programs with
organizing ideas, values, and principles of knowledge and society.”25
Second, constitutional identity is constitutional in the sense that it refers
to deep ideas pertaining to the nature of constitution, constitutional
structure, constitutional rights, and socio-economic constitutional
principles that underpin quotidian constitutional practices, which are
normally codified in a nation’s constitutional text. Third, constitutional
identity is identitarian in the sense that the constitutional ideas and
principles present beliefs on long-term goals, aspirations, and
commitments constituting the essence of a constitutional polity.26

21

Id. at 22.
Id. at 18.
23
Id. at 3.
24
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2011). For review of this book and the author’s response, see David A.
Strauss, Not Unwritten, After All, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (2013); Akhil Reed Amar, American
Constitutionalism — Written, Unwritten, and Living, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 195 (2013); JACK M.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
25
Vivien A. Schmidt, Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and
Discourse, 11 ANN. REV. POLIT. SCI. 303, 306 (2008) (citations omitted).
26
Jacobsohn particularly underlines the aspirational aspect of constitutional identity. For his
extensive treatment on this, see GARY J. JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DECLINE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION (1986). For other discussions on constitutional aspiration, see
22
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So understood, constitutional identity is a distinctive concept and a
distinctive object for comparative constitutional inquiry. The prevailing
trend in comparative constitutional studies is the focus on rules and
institutions. However, underlying these rules and institutions are deep
constitutional ideas. Not only does a constitution provide concrete
guidance for political conduct of constitutional actors, but it also
implicitly or explicitly includes fundamental ideas which provide a
general directive of beliefs, aspirations, and commitments that propel the
function of the whole constitutional system. So, a study about
constitutional identity is distinctive in that it focuses not on rules and
institutions but on essential constitutional ideas and principles. It may
refer to rules and institutions as the embodiment of constitutional ideas
and principles. Constitutional identity inquiries are also different from
studies on unwritten or living constitutionalism in that they take written
constitutions seriously as the textual embodiments of constitutional
identity.
B.

Constitutional Disharmony

Constitutional identity is not fixed, but changeable. Jacobsohn
draws on Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory of tradition to develop a theory on
the nature and dynamic of constitutional identity. For MacIntyre, “a
living tradition is . . . a historically extended, socially embodied
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which
constitute that tradition.”27 He considers tradition as the embodiment of
“continuities of conflicts.”28 In his understanding, “a tradition becomes
mature just insofar as its adherents confront and find a national way
through or around these encounters with radical different and
incompatible positions.”29 Jacobsohn draws on MacIntyre's theory of
tradition as a living thing presenting “continuities and conflicts” to
support his theory regarding the nature and dynamic of constitutional
identity. He argues that constitutional identity “emerges dialogically and
represents a mix of political aspirations and commitments that are
expressive of a nation’s past, as well as the determination of those within
the society who seek in some ways to transcend the past.”30
To Jacobsohn, the dynamics of constitutional identity are animated
by “the universal constitutional condition, which is that in one way or
another all constitutions confront or embody the problem of
Symposium, Constitutional Interpretation and Aspirations to a Good Society: The Natural RightsBased Justification for Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2119 (2001).
27
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 207 (1981).
28
Id. at 206.
29
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 327 (1988).
30
JACOBSOHN, supra note 14, at 7.
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disharmony.”31 He states that “the ‘disharmonic constitution’ does not
refer to the incoherence of constitutions- though that may indeed be the
condition of some- but to the dissonance within and around the
constitution that is key to understand its identity.”32 There are two
aspects of the disharmonic constitution: internal and external. The text of
national constitution is itself disharmonic in the sense that it encompasses
competing commitments or “contradiction and imbalances.”33 So, the
exploration of constitutional identity requires the understanding of
alternative visions and aspirations internal to the constitutional text. The
external aspect refers to the gap between the aspirational constitutional
commitments or ideals and the reality, or in Jacobsohn’s parlance, “the
lack of agreement evident in the sharp discontinuities that frame the
constitution’s relationship to the surrounding society.”34 Constitutional
disharmony provokes change in constitutional identity. Jacobsohn states
that “to apprehend constitutional identity is to see its dynamic quality,
which results from the interplay of forces seeking either to introduce
greater harmony into the constitutional equation or, contrariwise, to
create further disharmony.”35
Jacobsohn’s theory of constitutional disharmony is heuristic to
explore constitutional identity change. Other scholars share a common
view, although they may use different terms. Hanna Pitkin, for example,
contends that: “To understand what a constitution is, one must look not to
some crystalline core or essence of unambiguous meaning but precisely
at the ambiguities, the specific oppositions that this specific concept
helps us to hold in tension.”36 Ideology theory in legal sociology also
makes similar claims.37 Alan Hunt argues that: “An ideology is not a
unitary entity. It draws its power from its ability to connect and combine
diverse mental elements (concepts, ideas, etc.) into combinations that
influence and structure the perception and cognition of social agents.”38
The idea of disharmony also resonated with the Marxist dialectic’s thesis
31

Id. at 86–87.
Id. at 15.
33
Id. at 87. For example, the commitments to both positive and negative rights. Id. at 149.
34
Id. at 87. This is due to the fact that the constitutions are committed to “the achievement of
things seemingly beyond its immediate reach.” Id. at 145. Jacobsohn gives example of Directive
Principles of State Policy in India Constitution, which are nonjusticiable. Id. at 146. As we will see in
the case-studies below, the socialist constitutions also include many aspirations that are disharmonic to
the social reality.
35
Id. at 88.
36
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEG. EDU. 167, 167 (1987).
37
NICOS POULANTZAS, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES (T. O’Hagan trans., 1973); Alan
Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of Ideology to the Analysis
of Law, 19 L. SOC. REV. 11 (1985); Maureen Cain, Gramsci, The State and the Place of Law, in
LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE (David Sugerman ed., 1983). I thank John Gillespie for drawing
my attention to this literature.
38
Hunt, supra note 37, at 16.
32
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on conflicts as the source of change, which has influenced the political
ideology in socialist regimes.
The theory of constitutional disharmony seemingly contradicts the
Confucian philosophy of social harmony, which has informed political
culture in such countries like China and Vietnam. In fact, Confucianism
promotes the idea of “harmony but not sameness” (Analects, 13:23).
Chenyang Li’s recent comprehensive treatment of the theme suggests
that, in Confucian philosophy, harmony exists with creative tension and
does not exclude conflicts and differences.39 Particularly, according to
the Book of Change or I Ching, one of the Confucian Five Classics,40 the
logics of change essentially lie on the interaction of the two conflicting
forces called Yin and Yang.
However, several points in Jacobsohn’s theory must be qualified
and refined. To begin with, constitutional identity dynamics are defined
by the dialogical interactions between local (specific) and global
(generic) constitutional identity. The universal constitutional condition
of disharmony, in one way or another, manifests in all constitutions, not
necessarily liberal constitutions. This is evident if we consider the
generic and specific contents of constitutional identity. The legal
codification of both generic and specific values and principles in a single
charter constitutes conflicting aspirations and commitments.
Constitutional identity emerges as the consequence of the dialogical
interactions between generic and specific aspirations and commitments.
Moreover, within a particular constitutional polity, there are pluralized,
particularistic values and principles that govern the polity whose
dialogical interactions create the dynamics of constitutional identity.
However, although Jacobsohn recognizes that the disharmony
between generic and specific aspiration is the condition of change in
constitutional identity, he directs most of his attention to disharmony of
specific constitutional identity. The explanation for this is that his theory
is developed on the experience of constitutionalist states (the United
States, India, Israel, and Ireland) whose constitutions already incorporate
the generic requirements of constitutionalism. If constitutional identity is
understood as the identity of the constitution, not the identity of the
people as constitutional authors, even non-constitutionalist polities can
also acquire constitutional identity. Authoritarian polities are also
committed to fundamental aspirations codified in their constitutions
which inform constitutional politics and citizens’ activities. Some
39

CHENYANG LI, THE CONFUCIAN PHILOSOPHY OF HARMONY 12–13 (2014).
This Confucian Classic is extensively explored by a Yale constitutional law professor, see
JACK M. BALKIN, THE LAWS OF CHANGE: I CHING AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE (2009).
40
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concrete constitutional rules may be irrelevant to the practice of the
authoritarian systems and the daily lives of the citizens. However, the
operation of the whole authoritarian polity is inevitably driven by the
constitutionally-codified fundamental aspirations, although these
aspirations may be imposed by authoritarian leaders. For example,
although a Vietnamese citizen may not be aware of a concrete
constitutional provision on a certain right, or a Vietnamese political
leader may not be aware of a specific constitutional rule on state
structure, the whole Vietnamese community is inevitably affected by the
fundamental commitment to socialist aspirations codified in the nation’s
constitution.
Fundamental constitutional commitments of authoritarian regimes
may have the intention to limit the state power. They may be specific
and disharmonic with generic constitutionalist aspirations. Socialist
constitutional systems have been constructed on the base of specific
kinds of underlying constitutional ideas and principles, and by that, they
acquire distinctive constitutional identity. The disharmony between
generic and specific aspirations is an important source of constitutional
identity change in socialist polities. The gap between socialist and global
constitutional aspirations engenders efforts to bridge this gap. Therefore,
to understand the dynamics of constitutional identity in socialist states, it
is important to explore the disharmony between specific socialist
constitutional aspirations and generic constitutionalism. I call this
normative constitutional disharmony. All in all, constitutional identity
change is animated by the universal constitutional condition presented by
three elements, namely internal, external, and normative constitutional
disharmonies.
C.

Constitutional Globalization

Tushnet argues that the globalization of constitutional law is
inevitable due to top-down pressures (the emergence of global networks
of constitutional judges, the involvement of transnational
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in national constitutional
matters, the incorporation of international human rights treaties into
national constitutions, and transnational migration of workers) and
bottom-up pressures (competitions among nations for investment and
human capital).41 Constitutional globalization is also driven by a bottomup factor having less to do with material calculation: constitutional
disharmony.

41

Tushnet, supra note 4, at 987–95.
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Constitutional disharmony is crucial to the inevitable constitutional
globalization.
Jacobsohn contends that: “This disharmonic
jurisprudential context establishes the incentives, opportunities, and costs
inhering in the practice of looking abroad for interpretive inspiration.”42
Consequently, local actors may engage in transnational and global
dialogue in defining constitutional meanings and constitutional identity. 43
But this is not necessarily limited to constitutional interpretation.
Domestic constitutional disharmony incentivizes social and institutional
actors to look into the pool of global ideas and experiences to seek
constitutional consistency by formal constitution-making, as the case of
South Africa indicates.44 Especially in developing countries, the gap
between national constitutions and global standards of constitutionalism
creates the incentives and opportunities for looking abroad for
constitution-making or constitutional amendment.
While the global spread of constitutional ideas is inevitable, these
ideas are situated within the local context and balanced with local ideas.
Tushnet states, “Every society's law is tied to so many aspects of that
society—its politics, its particular history, its intellectual life, the
institutional forms in which its activities are conducted, and many
more.”45 Constitutional law is particularly prominent in this regard.
Saunders underlines: “Constitutions are inherently local instruments.
They must respond to local needs and they must be ‘owned’ both by the
people of the state concerned and by their political leaders from time to
time.”46 So, global constitutional ideas are balanced in the local context.
Jacobsohn argues that global constitutional norms “need to be reconciled
with the particularistic commitments of local traditions and practices; the
contours of constitutional identity will, to a large extent, reflect how
these disharmonies get resolved.”47 The consequence is the interaction
and balancing of global/local constitutional identities.
D.

Dialogical Change of Constitutional Identity

For Jacobsohn, constitutional identity is formulated and evolves
through “dialogical enterprises” comprising “interpretive and political
activity” occurring in public and private domains.48 Courts are the
42

JACOBSOHN, supra note 14, at 142.
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principal, but not exclusive, shapers and articulators of constitutional
identity.49 A wide range of actors (the courts, legislature, executive, and
the people) engage in constitutional dialogue in the determination and
clarification of substantial constitutional meanings and constitutional
identities.50 This argument is supported by the theories of popular
constitutionalism developed by American constitutionalists, such as
Tushnet and Larry Kramer.51 However, as Heinz Klug rightly comments,
“judicial decisions remain at the core of Jacobsohn's empirical
analysis.”52 Jacobsohn’s theory is informed by constitutional experience
in stable, liberal polities where judicial review operates as the mechanism
of constitutional change. Consequently, he has not yet accounted for the
possibility of a non-judicial dialogical mechanism of change in
constitutional identity.
In the socialist nations where judicial review is absent,
constitutional change is normally undertaken through formal
constitution-making and constitutional amendment. Especially, the
moment of constitution-making creates space for constitutional dialogue
among different political actors. The theory of the disharmonic
constitution therefore must incorporate constitutional dialogue during the
moment of formal constitutional change. Constitutional dialogue in such
moments does not feature the way in which the dialogical interaction of
judges with other political actors elaborates the meanings of the existing
constitution. Rather, it features the way in which the dialogical
interaction of the public and the government envisage the meaning of a
normative constitution or a desirable constitutional order by taking the
existing constitution as a starting foil. The constitutional disharmony
operates as the condition of the dynamics of constitutional dialogue.
Furthermore, like Vicki Jackson53 and David Law,54 Jacobsohn
tends to focus on judicial engagement in transnational dialogue. But
there is also transnational engagement in constitution-making. Foreign
and global sources are important for developing countries, like socialist
countries, creating their constitutional identity by bridging the
disharmonic gap between nation-specific constitutional identity and
generic constitutional identity. But this need not take place by judicial
engagement, as judicial review of constitutional questions is absent in
49

Id.
For a recent account of constitutional dialogue in Asian context, see PO JEN YAP,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE IN COMMON LAW ASIA (2015).
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contemporary socialist countries. Alternatively, the constitution-making
process allows political actors, constitution-makers, and social actors to
engage in a transnational constitutional dialogue in which global and
local sources disharmoniously interact and balance, provoking change in
constitutional identity.
II.

SOCIALIST CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY

Before considering the change to socialist constitutional identity, it
is necessary to briefly introduce its common core.55 The specific socialist
constitutional identities are sharply disharmonic with the aspirations of
global constitutionalism.
A.

Constitutional Instrumentalism

In global constitutionalism, a constitution is conceived as the
document of the people, which establishes written legal limitations on the
public power.56 This is philosophically underpinned by the social
contract theories of the Enlightenment era.57 All socialist countries have
a document called a constitution, but these socialist documents are selfunderstood not as the legal limitations upon the governmental power but
as an instrument of the party-state to structuralize and aggrandize its
power so as to control and direct the society toward achieving the
socialist goals. Simply speaking, while constitutionalism conceives of
constitutions as a tool for the people to control the state, socialist
constitutional instrumentalism uses constitutions as the tool for the state
to control the people. All of the contemporary socialist countries have a
written constitution that are often amended and replaced to suit the
changes in ideology, policy, and leadership of a communist party.
B.

Constitutional Vanguardism

In generic constitutionalism, “the will of the people is the source of
authority and the basis of legitimate government.”58 Legitimate power is
created through free and equal election. Differently, the use of the public
power in the socialist world is constitutionally pre-established as the
prerogative of the communist party conceived as the “vanguard” force of
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For extensive elaborations, see Chris Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of the
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the working class, the ruling class in the socialist word.59 The concept of
vanguardism is attributed to V.I. Lenin, according to which “real power
lay with the Communist Party.”60 Consequently, constitution, law, state,
and the society are all under the control of the communist party. The
communist party therefore is different from political parties in a liberal
democracy. It is not a private political organization created to compete
for power through free election because its monopoly of power has been
established as a reality and mandated in the constitution. Rather, the
communist party is an essential component of the polity, created with the
aspiration to control the state and the society, and to direct the polity
toward socialism.61 The leadership of the communist party remains the
core of constitutional identity of the five contemporary socialist
countries.
C.

“Democratic Centralism”

The separation of power and checks and balances are normally
conceived as the global identity of constitutionalism.62 In the socialist
world, there are also three legislative, executive, and judicial powers,
practiced by three different state bodies. But, the socialist constitutional
structure is created according to a distinctive socialist principle called
“democratic centralism,” an antithesis of the Montesquieuian tripartite
government. Initially, “democratic centralism” was introduced by V.I.
Lenin as the principle of party activity. Simply speaking, it aims to
combine “democratic” discussions and centralized actions. After
“democratic discussion,” superiors will issue a “conclusion” or order
which requires unquestioning obedience from the inferiors.63
“Democratic centralism” was then applied in state organization and
actions, rendered as “unity of power” as opposed to the separation of
power. It is constitutionally characterized by the idea that state power is
centralized in the popularly elected representative body. Within this
formal scheme of united power, all other state bodies are subordinate to
the supreme legislature. In this socialist constitutional arrangement,
labor divisions among the three state organs are possible, but they must
work together. This arrangement rejects the separation of power and
checks and balances as these will weaken the power and prevent power
59
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cooperation. The constitutional structure in the contemporary socialist
world retains this identity of unitary and centralized power.

D.

Rights Statism

Constitutionalism conceives of universal human rights as limits of
the use of the public power.64 Socialist constitutions also include rights
provisions, defined by a statist conceptualization of rights.65 Statist rights
are underpinned by Marxist legal positivism, constitutional
instrumentalism, and historical materialism. Marxist legal positivism
leads to the idea that rights are positively granted by the state. Marxist
constitutional instrumentalism suggests that rights are not the limits on
the state but instead can be limited by the state for the state’s purposes.
Historical materialism justifies the social determination of rights. The
Constitutions of the five contemporary socialist countries include rights
provisions in the line of statism.
E.

Economic Statism

The protection of property rights is now considered an essential
element of global constitutionalism.66 Moreover, the market economy is
the worldwide practice, the condition of a well-functioning constitutional
government.67 Socialist countries, however, have a distinctive
constitutional economy, which rests on the assumption that to achieve
socialism, the state needs to centrally plan the working of the economy
and control substantial economic resources like lands and other
properties. The consequence of this economic statism is the state-owned
economy in the socialist world.68 This remains as the essential feature of
the five contemporary socialist countries.
III.

A CASE-STUDY: VIETNAM
A.

Constitutional Disharmony

By way of background, Vietnam has enacted five constitutions
under the leadership of the Communist Party: the 1946 Constitution after
64
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the August Revolution; the 1959 Constitution in North Vietnam after the
Geneva Conference dividing Vietnam into two separate zones; the 1980
Constitution after national unification; the 1992 Constitution after the
1986 Đổi mới (Renovation) initiative; and most recently the 2013
Constitution in the context of the nation’s active integration into the
global economic and political order.69 The first constitution was more
liberal, while the four later were influenced by socialist constitutional
tradition. After the first amendment in 2001, the party-state again
introduced a plan to revise the 1992 Constitution in 2011, but eventually
replaced it with the new 2013 Constitution. This new Constitution
presents important adaptive changes to the core of socialist constitutional
identity which is conditioned by the disharmony internal to and
surrounding the 1992 Constitution.
The 1992 Constitution was enacted in response to the Đổi mới
program initiated by the Party in 1986, which was meant to transform the
centrally planned economy into the “socialist-oriented market economy.”
The Constitution continued but began to modify the essence of socialist
constitutional identity. Notably, it introduced competing visions which
promoted both economic liberalization and socialist orientation. It
recognized the role of private economic sectors, indicative of the
adaption of the socialist specific identity, namely, the state-owned
economy, by incorporating generic liberal values.70 In practice, Vietnam
implemented the “socialist-oriented market economy” in nearly three
decades on the framework established by the 1992 Constitution. The
Constitution also included provisions which facilitated global political
and economic integration and at the same time removed the commitment
to exclusive diplomatic relationships with socialist nations.71 In practice,
Vietnam has established diplomatic relationships with 186 nations
throughout the world72 and joined major international economic
institutions like the World Trade Organization (2007).73
New Institutional Economics suggests that a market economy
(even socialist oriented) requires the rule of law, limited government, and
the protection of human rights, especially economic rights.74 Hence, new
69
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constitutional provisions facilitating economic reform were adopted
together with the revised institutional setting. The Leninist unitary
constitutional structure continued but was modified to make the power
less concentrated: the government was vested with more independent
administrative authorities; the prime minister had more individual
authorities and responsibilities; and the individual presidency was
established.75 The 1992 Constitution also introduced for the first time the
term of “human rights” understood as being expressed in “the right of
citizens.”76 The constitutional amendments in 2001 introduced the idea
of the “socialist rule of law state.” This was an attempt to marry the
specific socialist legality, a socialist form of rule by law, with the western
concept of the rule of law.
Consequently, the 1992 Constitution was a disharmonic
constitution. Internally, it remained a socialist document but included
competing understandings of market economy, human rights, and rule of
law. Most importantly, the constitutional enshrinement of the idea of the
rule of law state has precipitated more substantial reformist discourse.
The idea of the socialist rule of law state is an ambiguous one. The
ambiguous language of the socialist rule of law state opens the door for
alternative interpretations. The concept of “socialist rule of law state”
has operated as the epistemic foil for reformist constitutional discourse in
early twentieth century Vietnam. A member of the Constitutional
Amendment Committee told me that one of the reasons for the enactment
of the new 2013 Constitution was the development of the “social
cognition of the rule of law state.”77
The commitment to the socialist rule of law state has stipulated
new visions on law, state power, rights, and public institutional
arrangements. Since the introduction of the concept of socialist rule of
law state in 2001 in the Constitution, there have been creative efforts
among political leaders, officials, and legal scholars, as well as other
public intellectuals. These creative efforts have focused on the
construction of its substantial meanings and reforming arguments
pertaining to party leadership, state institutions, limiting arbitrary power,
constitutional review, human rights protection, and judicial independence
within that framework.78
75
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Externally, the 1992 Constitution includes many constitutional
aspirations (such as human rights protection and construction of the rule
of law state) that are disharmonic to the social reality (such as human
rights restrictions and corruption). The Constitution also includes several
fundamental commitments, such as “building a prosperous life for its
people, a strong country and an equitable, democratic and civilised
society, ensuring the well-being, freedom and happiness of all citizens as
well as conditions for their all-round development” (Article 3), which are
discordant with the reality in Vietnam of a developing country with many
people living in poor conditions, especially the rural population which
occupied 66% of the total population by 2015.79 These conditions
encourage a continuous struggle to close the gap between constitutional
commitments and reality.
Normatively, the 1992 Constitution is dissonant with global
requirements of constitutionalism in many points (such as the
instrumentalist constitution, the leadership of the communist party,
centralized power, individual rights, and the economy controlled by the
state). These constitutional gaps provide the space for, and incentivize
different actors to, struggle for constitutional consistency. To illustrate,
constitutional law Professor Nguyễn Đăng Dung at Vietnam National
University Law School at Hanoi criticizes the 1992 Constitution for
failing to meet the normative requirements of generic constitutionalism.
Professor Nguyễn Đăng Dung draws on Louis Henkin to define these
requirements as limited government, whose requirements include:
constitution-making by a constitutional convention or special procedures,
the separation of powers, judicial independence, and the protection of
human rights.80 He then advocates that: “To have an authentic
NUỚC VÀ PHÁP LUẬT 27 (2007); Phan Trung Lý, Tổ chức và hoạt động quốc hội theo yêu cầu nhà
nước pháp quyền XHCN [Organization and Operation of the National Assembly According to the
Requirements of Socialist Rule of Law State], 2+3 NGHIỆN CỨU LẬP PHÁP 31 (2009); Phạm Tuấn Khải,
Đổi mới tổ chức và hoạt động chính phủ theo yêu cầu nhà nước pháp quyền XHCN [Renovating the
Organization and Operation of the Government According to the Requirements of Socialist Rule of
Law State], 2+3 NGHIỆN CỨU LẬP PHÁP 44 (2009); Vũ Văn Nhiêm, Một số ý kiến về sự lãnh đạo của
Đảng với nhà nước trong điều kiện xây dựng nhà nước pháp quyền ở nước ta hiện nay [Some
Comments on the Leadership of the Party Over the State in the Context of Building the Rule of Law in
our Country Today], 1 Khoa HỌC PHÁP LÝ 3 (2009); Đinh Văn Mậu, Kiểm soát quyền lực nhà nước
trong nhà nước pháp quyền ở Việt Nam hiện nay [Controlling the State Power in The Rule of Law
State in Today’s Vietnam], 10 QUẢN LÝ LÝ NHÀ NUỚC 2 (2009); Tường Duy Kiên, Quyền con người
trong nhà nước pháp quyền xã hội chủ nghĩa ở nước ta hiện nay [Human Rights in the Rule of Law
State in Our Country Today], 6 NHÀ NUỚC VÀ PHÁP LUẬT 70 (2010); Nguyễn Phú Trọng, Sự phát
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constitution, we must have ‘constitutionalism.’ Simply speaking,
‘constitutionalism’ is the necessary theory which serves as the base for
constitution-making and amending the authentic constitution.”81
In short, the adaptive change to the socialist constitutional identity
in Vietnam is animated by the universal condition of constitutional
disharmony. The 1992 Constitution is a disharmonic constitution, giving
rise to a socialist constitutional identity culminating in the adaptions
embodied in the new 2013 Constitution.
B.

Constitutional Globalization

This section considers the impact of constitutional globalization on
constitution-making and constitutional discourse in Vietnam in 2013. I
met and exchanged with some constitution-makers during this time and
further interviewed them Hanoi in January 2017. During my interviews,
constitution-makers mentioned to me several global factors that resulted
in constitution-making in Vietnam, including international economic
integration, Vietnam’s ratification of international human rights treaties,
and the globalization of Vietnamese legal scholarship.82 They said that
Vietnam needs to reform the constitutional system to better integrate into
the global community.83 The Party even instructed constitution-makers
to reference foreign constitutional experience.84
The internal
contradiction of the 1992 Constitution, the gap between this socialist
constitution and social reality, and especially the gap between this charter
and normative requirements of global constitutionalism, creates
incentives, spaces, and chances for different actors to turn to global
sources for constitution-making inspirations to achieve more
constitutional consistency.
In fact, general ideas of global constitutionalism have been
diffused in Vietnam by various channels. One such channel has been the
translation of enlightenment thinkers’ work into Vietnamese. JeanJacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract and Montesquieu’s The Spirit of
The Laws have been republished and referenced more often in the
2010s.85 In addition, the new century features publication for the first
time in Vietnamese of works by other western liberal thinkers, such as
John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, and John Stuart Mill’s
81
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Considerations on Representative Government and On Liberty.86 The
publication of these books in the Vietnamese language is instrumental to
Soviet-trained senior constitutional scholars and Vietnamese-trained
scholars in gaining access to western liberalist ideas, which inspire them
to envisage new ideas on the constitution, rights, and the public power.
Consequently, as will be discussed below, the constitutional intellectuals
advocate for a contractual constitution, constitutional referendum, natural
rights, and the separation of power, which are characteristically
predicated on European enlightenment liberalism, which challenges the
established socialist constitutional understanding.
Translation work has also resulted in the impact of American
liberal constitutionalism on the Vietnamese constitutional intellectual
life. The Vietnamese version of the Federalist Papers has been
increasingly referenced.87
Additionally, the twenty-first century
witnessed publications in Vietnamese of Tocqueville’s Democracy in
America88 and James Madison's Notes On the Constitutional Convention
of 1787.89 The Embassy of the United States in Hanoi also publishes
Vietnamese translations of informational work on modern
constitutionalism and the American constitutional system.90
The
particular consequences of the influence of American constitutionalism in
Vietnamese constitutional intellectual life are the constitutional proposals
of constitutional limitations, constitutional endurance, constituent power
and constitutional convention, and judicial review.
American
constitutionalism is also referenced in other constitutional discourse
regarding the separation of power, human rights, and judicial
independence.
In addition to legal translation, the development of legal education
is another factor conducive to the diffusion of generic constitutional ideas
in Vietnam. Young Vietnamese constitutionalists and lawyers trained
86
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either in European universities (such as France, Germany, and the
Netherlands) or American law schools play an especially important role
in the diffusion of new constitutional ideas in Vietnam. 91 They are
competent in foreign languages, particularly English, which is
instrumental to their imbibing and disseminating western and global
ideas. Their exchanges and publications in Vietnamese buttress senior
constitutionalists’ support of western and global ideas. As Mark Sidel
states, Vietnamese constitutional scholars “have also explored theory and
constitutional development in Europe, North America, Asia, and
elsewhere.”92 The publications of constitutionalists and lawyers in
Vietnam have helped spread the constitutional government ideas and
practices of major western nations.93 Western liberal constitutionalism
informs new discourse in Vietnam on popular sovereignty, separation of
power, checks and balances, constitutional review, human rights, and
judicial independence. Many Vietnamese constitutional intellectuals
invoke western liberal constitutional experiences in different ways.
Importantly, Vietnamese constitutional intellectuals now no longer work
purely within the four walls of academia. They have engaged in
constitutional dialogues with local legislators and constitution-makers,
which precipitates the pluralization of their constitutional thinking.
Workshops and conferences on constitutional issues have not been purely
academic: law-makers and constitution-makers have often been invited to
attend these fora and exchanged ideas with scholars.94
Global constitutional ideas have also been diffused in Vietnam
through transnational dialogues, especially the dialogues on human
rights. International human rights laws (particularly, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights) are important to the change of Vietnamese
comprehension of human rights from a specific to a more cosmopolitan
posture. Both constitution-makers and public intellectuals accept the idea
that constitutional rights in Vietnam must be consistent with international
human rights treaties that Vietnam has signed.95 The Vietnamese
government has also engaged in transnational human rights dialogues
with international bodies like the UN Human Rights Committee and with
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the United States, the European Community, Australia, and Canada.96
The dialogical interactions with foreign leaders in transitional fora have
further engendered disharmonic visions on human rights: the socialist
specific and the universalist understandings of human rights.
International legal aid programs also contribute to the diffusion of
global constitutional ideas in Vietnam. As evidence of the new
movement of “law and development,”97 the United Nations Development
Programme in Vietnam and some European governments have supported
organizing a number of workshops on constitutional revision issues,
which have created the platform for Vietnamese legislators, constitutionmakers, domestic scholars, and international scholars to exchange
constitutional ideas.
Through this dialogical platform, global
constitutional ideas have affected the thinking of local legislators,
constitution-makers, and intellectuals, facilitating the emergence of
alternative constitutional ideas.
Globalization has engendered what social science scholars call
“social complexity.”98 A social system becomes significantly complex
“when there are strong interactions among its elements, so that current
events heavily influence the probabilities of many kinds of later
events.”99 Social scientists point out that: “Social complexity generated
by globalization and rapid economic change compels both the state and
citizens to step outside pre-existing identities and change their thinking
about which groups matter most and which groups matter least.”100
Turning to the case of Vietnam, Gillespie demonstrates that the
implementation of the Renovation program and the country’s integration
into the global community have generated social complexity in Vietnam
and stimulated the change of legal ideas.101 He concludes:
Economic reforms, socialization, and globalization have
brought about rapid changes in most facets of Vietnamese
life. New ideas compete with old, creating contradictory
and sometimes confusing public discourse. Modernization
theory suggests that the party-state might respond to this

96

John Gillespie, Human Rights as a Larger Loyalty: The Evolution of Religious Freedom in
Vietnam, 27 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 107, 138 (2014).
97
See generally Carol V. Rose, The “New” Law and Development Movement in the Post-Cold
War Era: A Vietnam Case Study, 32 L. & SOC’Y REV. 93 (1998).
98
Gillespie, supra note 96, at 116.
99
Id. (citing MICHAEL D. COHEN & ROBERT AXELROD, HARNESSING COMPLEXITY:
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER 7 (1999)).
100
Id. at 117.
101
Gillespie, supra note 96, at 131–33.

486

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 26 NO. 3

complexity by expanding its loyalties to encompass new
social groups and ideas.102
An Assembly deputy who is deeply engaged in the constitutionmaking process told me that the enactment of the 2013 Constitution is a
response to “the development of people’s recognition,” which reflects
different understandings.103 Although the party-state in Vietnam has
persisted in political monism, social complexity has compelled it to
respond to pluralist ideas, pluralist interests, and demands of different
social forces by accommodating alternative constitutional values. The
consequence is the dialogical process of constitutional dynamics in
Vietnam. Socialist ideas dialogically interact with global ideas. The
party-state and the public have engaged in a constitutional dialogue to
redefine and adjust fundamental constitutional aspirations that will guide
the future development of the polity. This allows socialist constitutional
identity to evolve.
C.

Dialogical Change of Socialist Constitutional Identity

In Vietnam, judicial review is absent, and constitutional dialogue
proceeds in popular and political fora. Even in ordinary politics, despite
the state’s management, there are spaces for public discourse in which
constitutional meanings and constitutional identity are defined and
clarified. But the extraordinary moment of constitution-making offers
great space for constitutional dialogue. In 2013, constitution-makers
actively discussed substantive constitutional questions, the National
Assembly’s members had different views, and they listened to the
contentious debates among the public.104 Disharmonic constitutionmaking functions as a forum for the party, the state, and the people to
debate, contest, define, clarify, and develop the meanings and the
contents of the Vietnamese constitutional identity. This dialogical
constitution-making allows competing constitutional visions to emerge.
In that forum, socialist and global constitutional vision engages in a
conversation, although its outcome is decided by the socialist leadership.
The disharmonic nature of the 1992 Constitution creates the
condition for continuing constitutional debates, which eventually
culminated in a new round of constitution-making in 2013. The threeyear (2011–2013) constitution-making process involved a constitutional
dialogue in which the party-state, legislators, constitution-makers,
intellectuals, lawyers, activists, and others had controversially deliberated
102
103
104

Id. at 134.
Interview with an Assembly deputy in Hanoi, Vietnam (Jan. 2, 2017).
Id.

June 2017

Globalization of Constitutional Identity

487

on substantial constitutional issues.105 Socialist constitutional identity is
articulated, modified, and developed through constitutional dialogue in
which different actors advocate alternative socialist and global
constitutional visions. This is examined in detail below.
1.

Constitutional Instrumentalism

The social contract theories were introduced in Vietnam by early
Vietnamese constitutionalists.106 Hồ Chí Minh’s 1945 decree on
constitution-making also adopted this view.107 The 1946 Constitution
incarnates this conception to some extent: its preamble acknowledges
that the Vietnamese people are the author of the Constitution.108 The
contractual concept, however, was repudiated by the subsequent 1959,
1980, and 1992 socialist Constitutions, and class instrumentalism then
dominated the Vietnamese understanding of the nature of the
constitution.109 In the 2000s, however, classical social contract theories
witnessed a return in Vietnamese legal discourse. Especially around the
wave of the constitution-making process in the 2010s, constitutional
contractualism was a prevailing model for conceptualizing the nature of
the constitution as discussed below.
Contractualism is espoused by not only younger constitutionalists
but also senior Soviet-trained constitutional law scholars.110 To illustrate,
criticizing the class understanding of constitution as flawed, Professor
Đào Trí Úc, a senior legal scholar, opines that the constitution is the
“legal contract of different social forces” and “the legal foundation of the
entire society which recognizes and embodies the interests of the entire
society, [and] the general interests of the people and the nation, although
it always counts for the interests and the will of the leading class of the
society in different historical periods.”111 Professor Nguyễn Đăng Dung
presents a more radical shift to contractualism, evident in his numerous
writings during the constitution-making process. To cite an example,
invoking Rousseau and Thomas Paine, he suggested that the future
105
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Constitution in Vietnam should be conceived of as a social contract
reflecting the general will of the people, and a product of the people, not
the government.112 Contractualism also informs the constitutional
commentaries of other Soviet-trained legal scholars.113 The contractual
constitution was ardently hailed by the Vietnamese public. Official mass
media enlivened the idea of contractual constitution by approvingly
disseminating it from the academic to popular fora.114 Furthermore,
popular constitutional petitions were strongly influenced by the idea of a
contractual constitution.115
As the consequence of the concept of contractual constitution,
legal scholars, lawyers, senior officials, legislators, members of the
government, and retired politicians as well as members of civil society,
activists, and dissidents vehemently called for the people as the
constitutional author and popular ratification of a new Constitution.116
According to a reporter, “despite in different fora and in different time,
there is a convergence among many comments on the draft amendments
to the 1992 Constitution on vesting the constitution-making power to the
people.”117 To illustrate, in a public meeting, a commentator named
Nguyễn Hữu Chót stated:
The nature of our state is the state of the people, by the
people, and for the people, confirmed in Article 2 of the
[1992] Constitution . . . the practice of constitution-making
112

Nguyễn Đăng Dung, Hãy tìm cho mình một chỗ đứng trong Dự thảo Hiến pháp [Find Your
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194.
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a Social Contract], BÁO TUỔI TRẺ [YOUTH NEWSPAPER] (Feb. 2, 2013), http://tuoitre.vn/tin/chinh-trixa-hoi/20130223/hien-phap-phai-la-ban-khe-uoc-xa-hoi/535009.html; Hồ Tấn Sáng, Xây dựng Hiến
pháp là tạo ra ‘khế ước xã hội’ [Constitutional Building is to create a Social Contract], BÁO ĐÀ NẴNG
[DANANG NEWSPAPER] (Apr. 3, 2013), http://baodanang.vn/channel/5399/201304/xay-dung-hienphap-la-tao-ra-khe-uoc-xa-hoi-2231287/.
115
Interview with Mr. Lê Quang Bình in Hanoi, Vietnam (Jan. 16, 2017). Mr. Bình together with
other lead people submitted three constitutional petitions by civil society’s organizations and groups to
the Constitutional Amendment Committee. See also Bui Ngoc Son & Pip Nicholson, Activism and
Popular Constitutionalism in Contemporary Vietnam, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 114 (2016).
116
See, e.g., Nguyên Lê, Lập hiến là Quyền trực tiếp của Nhân dân [Constitution-making is the
Direct Right of the People], VNECONOMY (Feb. 20, 2013), http://vneconomy.vn/thoi-su/lap-hien-laquyen-truc-tiep-cua-nhan-dan-20130219030752355.htm.
117
Nguyên Lê, Quyền Lập hiến phải thuộc về Nhân dân [The Constituent Power Must Belong to
the People], VNECONOMY (Jan. 21, 2013), http://vneconomy.vn/thoi-su/quyen-lap-hien-phai-thuoc-venhan-dan-20130121111546767.htm.

June 2017

Globalization of Constitutional Identity

489

through indirect democracy (through the National
Assembly) as the current practice somewhat limits the
people’s power and does not [reflect] the will and the desire
of the people. Therefore, the Constitution must be amended
to make the constituent power [belong] to the people
through referendum.118
It can be seen that the intellectual community and society understood the
nature of the Constitution in the new contractual line. Intellectuals do
realize that this is a new understanding. To illustrate, a senior intellectual
named Phan Hữu Dật comments:
Formerly, there were people who understood that the
National Assembly is the supreme organ in our country
which possesses all legislative, executive, and judicial
powers.
Nowadays, there is a deeper and wider
understanding that the people are the supreme organ, which
stemmed from the recognition of the force of the people and
the people as the base of every enterprise. . . . That means
the new Constitution must guarantee the people’s right to
vote in referendum. Actually, this understanding is just a
return to the spirit and words of the 1946 Constitution of our
country.119
It is reported that: “During the deliberation at the National Assembly in
late 2012, some delegates suggested that after being approved by the
National Assembly, the Constitution must be voted in a referendum to be
valid. Referendum must be determined in the Constitution as a citizen’s
fundamental rights.”120 My interviews also indicate that constitutionmakers adopted a new understanding that the nature of the constitution is
the expression of the popular will, not merely the Party’s creed.121 The
Government also agrees: “It is necessary to determine that the constituent
power is the expression of the people’s supreme power, including the
powers to initiate constitution-making, to participate in the constitutional
drafting process, and finally to ratify [the constitution] in a
referendum.”122
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This new understanding about the nature of the constitution and
constitutional authorship is significantly different from the Soviet
constitutional instrumentalism. The state has begun to understand the
constitution as something belonging to the people and reflecting the
public will, rather than merely instrumental to its own interests. This
understanding reflects the initial convergence with generic constitutional
identity, a modification to the conventional instrumentalist recognition.
The regime’s new understanding of the nature of the constitution
also informs the reality of constitution-making to a certain extent. As I
have illustrated in length elsewhere, the 2013 constitution-making
process has encouraged the most participation and has been the most
open process in Vietnam.123 The Constitution and its formation is not
merely the instrument of the party-state but becomes the base for the
constitutional dialogue between the party-state and the people. This
constitutional dialogue also involves the exchange of ideas and opinions
about the nature of the constitution itself. In addition to practical actors,
an open constitutional conversation could happen in Vietnam under the
communist rule because there is a new understanding of the democratic
nature of constitution among the society and the party-state.
That said, the regime does not abandon the instrumentalist identity
of the socialist constitution. The party-state continues to conceive of the
constitution as the instrument to express the party’s policies in
constitutional terms.124 In reality, despite the open constitutional
dialogue, the party-state rejected most popular constitutional
submissions, suggestions, and petitions, including the call for
constitutional referendum, and imposed its constitutional references at
the last minute.125
Consequently, the new 2013 constitution continues to confirm the
instrumentalist essence of the socialist constitution, but incorporates new
ideas reflecting a commitment to a democratic constitution. This is best
expressed in its new preamble: “Institutionalizing the Political Creed of
Building the Nation during period of Transition to Socialism, and
inheriting the 1946 Constitution, 1959 Constitution, 1980 Constitution,
and 1992 Constitution, the Vietnamese People frame, implement, and
123

Bui, supra note 105, at 956.
Interviews, supra note 16; see also National Assembly’s Standing Committee, Tờ trình số
11/TTr-UBTVQH13 ngày 02/08/2011 của Ủy ban thường vụ Quốc hội về việc triển khai thực hiện chủ
trương nghiên cứu, sửa đổi, bổ sung Hiến pháp năm 1992 [The Proposal No. 11/TTr-UBTVQH13
dated
Aug.
2,
2011
of
the
National
Assembly’s
Standing
Committee
on Studying Amending the 1992 Constitution], http://duthaoonline.quochoi.vn/DuThao/Lists/DT_DUT
HAO_NGHIQUYET/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=32&TabIndex=2&TaiLieuID=65.
125
Bui Ngoc Son, supra note 105, at 971.
124

June 2017

Globalization of Constitutional Identity

491

protect this Constitution for the objectives of wealthy people, powerful
nation, democracy, justice, and civilization.”126 On the one hand, the
Constitution expressly acknowledges that it is enacted to institutionalize
the Party’s socialist directions. On the other hand, the global language of
“we the people” is employed to establish the commitment to popular
constituent authorship.127 So, the Constitution reflects the dissonant
tension between the socialist instrumentalist and the generic
understanding of the nature of the Constitution as the document of the
people.
Moreover, the Constitution is conceived as an instrument for
structuring the public power. On the other hand, constitution-makers
tend to subject the state to constitutional constraints: “The State is
organized and operates in concordance with the Constitution and the law,
governs the society by the Constitution and the law.”128 This is further
strengthened by the new requirement of constitutional oath taken by
senior politicians.129
Disharmony internal to, and surrounding, the 1992 Constitution led
to the identity adaption of constitutional instrumentalism in Vietnam.
First, the move to constitutional contractualism is animated by the gap
between the 1992 Constitution and the normative requirement of
constitutionalism regarding constitutional authorship.
That the
Constitution stipulates that the legislature possess the constitutionmaking power is inconsistent with the ideal of people’s constitutionmaking power, and this animates the struggle for consistency. Second,
the adaption to the instrumentalist identity of the Vietnamese
Constitution is animated by the ambiguity and contradiction internal to
the 1992 Constitution regarding the nature of the constitution and
constituent power. The 1992 Constitution declared that it was the
“supreme law” of the state,130 but it was in fact enacted by an ordinary
legislature (the National Assembly) and provided that this legislature has
both law-making and constitution-making power,131 which is discordant
with the provision on constitutional supremacy. This dissonance
animated the discourse on contractual constitution and constitutional
referendum, which attempts to establish the constitution as the true
supreme law of the land because the constituent power is vested in the
people. Third, the reemergence of constitutional contractualism is
126
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animated by the gap between constitution-making power in paper and in
reality. In Vietnam, the legislature is the supreme body of constitutionmaking power in text, but the Party is possessor of the constitutionmaking power in reality. Constitution-making is initiated, controlled, and
concluded by the Party. So, the call for people’s ratification of the
Constitution implicitly aims to curtail the Party’s power in constitutionmaking and vest it into the hands of the people, or at least demonstrates
an unsatisfactory disposition toward instrumentalist identity of the
socialist constitution.
These constitutional disharmonies create the incentive for the turn
to global sources. The global idea of contractual constitution is diffused
in Vietnam and informs the domestic discourse on the nature of the
constitution and constituent power. However, this global idea is situated
in the local context. The public intellectuals and citizens draw from a
wide range of sources to formulate a new understanding of the nature of
the constitution: classical theories of social contract, foreign experiences,
nationalist sources, and local political ideology. First, the call for
contractual constitution in Vietnam is informed by social contract
theories. Second, the world practice of constitutional referendum was
also invoked to justify its practice in Vietnam. 132 Third, the legacy of the
1946 Constitution was often summoned to legitimatize popular
constitution-making, as its provision of constitutional referendum is
conceived as the embodiment of the idea of social contract and the
principle of popular sovereignty.133 Finally, the Party’s rhetoric of “the
state of the people, by the people, and for the people,” was also
vindicated for this purpose. So, there is a balance between global and
local source in the formulation of the new understanding of the nature of
the constitution and constituent power.
The 2013 constitution-making process operated as the mechanism
through which politicians, officials, lawyers, legal scholars, public
intellectuals, and citizens engaged in a critical dialogue about the nature
of the Constitution. This constitutional dialogue was influential enough
to generate the modification of the regime’s instrumentalist
understanding of the nature of the Constitution. The birth of the new
2013 Constitution is conceived as the “landmark in the development of
understanding about the Constitution in Vietnam” and “the base for the
132
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continuous renovation of the understanding about the constitution.”134
Constitution-makers believe Vietnam’s understanding of the Constitution
is now closer to “international standard of a modern constitution.”135 The
language of the new 2013 Constitution indicates a modified
understanding on the instrumentalist essence of the socialist constitution
in Vietnam. The new commitment to popular constitutional authorship is
reflective of the critical dialogue between the public and the party-state
on the nature of the Constitution and constituent power.
2.

Constitutional Vanguardism

The 1946 Constitution was enacted by a multi-party constituent
assembly, albeit under the leadership of the Communist Party, and did
not have any provision about this Party. The 1959 Constitution referred
to the leadership of the Party in its preamble.136 The 1980 Constitution
firmly mandated the exclusive leadership of the Party in Article 4.137
Article 4 of the 1992 Constitution continued to provide for the party
leadership but this leadership was not exclusive, reading as follows: “The
Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the Vietnamese working
class and loyal representative of the interests of the working class, the
working people and the whole nation, who adheres to Marxism-Leninism
and Ho Chi Minh’s thought, is the force assuming leadership of the State
and society.”138 Article 4 was then described as the sacrosanct gospel and
was taboo in constitutional discussion in Vietnam for many years.
However, during the 2013 constitution-making process, the partystate, public intellectuals, dissidents, and the senior members of the Party
participated in a critical dialogue to redefine the meaning of party
leadership. At the extreme level, radical liberals, dissidents, and even
retired Party’s members imputed the shortcoming of the communist
party’s leadership to the lack of political competitions and the checks and
balances among different political forces.139 They, therefore, called for a
radical change in constitutional identity by establishing a multi-party
134
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system. To illustrate, a petition initiated by seventy-two intellectuals,
many of whom are party-members, called for free elections and political
competition, implying a multi-party system.140
In a public letter, Lê Hiếu Đằng—a lawyer and party member, who
worked for a long time in the Vietnam Father Front (the political
organization closely tied to the Communist Party)—eventually called for
creation of a “Democratic and Social Party” to compete with the
Communist Party, which triggered wide attention.141 He reasoned that
economic development would create different social groups who would
form different organizations to protect their interests.142 “This is the
natural trend, and therefore a multi-party system is indisputable, and
Article 4 of the Constitution is senseless.”143 He also commented on the
legal base for creating an alternative party: “The policy of no multi-party
system is the policy of the Communist Party. There is not any law
prohibiting this.”144 He then suggests that the party members who no
longer want to be the party’s members can “declare the abandonment of
the [Communist] Party and create a new party, like the Democratic and
Social Party.”145 Lê Hiếu Đằng publicly declared himself to be an
apostate in December 2013, shortly before he passed away.146
The proponents of a multi-party system do not repudiate the role of
the Communist Party, but instead insist that if the Party aspires to lead
the state and the society on the legitimate base, it must participate in
equal political competitions through free elections and be checked and
balanced by other parties. An incumbent senior official agreed with the
creation of the new party, but stated that the new party will not oppose,
but cooperate with, the Communist Party “to build democracy for
Vietnam.”147
However, the mainstream trend is not to radically change the
constitutional identity regarding the Communist Party, but to modify it
by reconciling the disharmony between party leadership and people’s
140
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sovereignty. To illustrate, consider the notable comment by former
President of the National Assembly, Nguyễn Văn An. He boldly points
out that the party has interfered in state governance and even violated the
Constitution.148 He stated that the reality that the General Secretary of
the Party heads the Central Military Commission, the highest Party organ
on military issues in Vietnam, is unconstitutional because the 1992
Constitution provides that the President of State is the commander of the
military force. He then suggested that a law pertaining to the Party
should be enacted to separate party leadership from state governance and
to ensure the constitutionality and legality in the party’s action.149
Many Party scholars share the view that the new Constitution should
mandate the enactment of law pertaining to the Party. This is meant to
reconcile the disharmony between the principle of popular sovereignty
and the principle of party leadership. The idea is that the leadership of
the Communist Party must be constrained by law to avoid party
arbitrariness and to make the Party accountable to the people. Consider,
for example, the debate on the draft Constitution in a meeting of the
Vietnam Father Front.150 A senior member named Phạm Xuân Hằng
agrees on the constitutional mandate of the party leadership, but suggests
that this leadership must be “guaranteed by law and defined by law” to
ensure that the Party “is under the people’s supervision” and “is
accountable to the people in its decisions.”151 He further underlines that:
“This is not a new issue. Many cadres and party members have
expressed this thought. In the trend of perfecting the socialist rule of law
state, we think that this is the fundamental issue of political
transparency.”152 Another senior member, Hoàng Thái, concedes, stating
that: “Every organ has a law to regulate it. The Party is the core of the
political system but there is no law about it. This is unacceptable. There
should be such law so that the Party will operate publicly and
transparently, avoiding arbitrariness.”153 In an article published in
official media, Bùi Đức Lại, who used to work as a senior specialist for
the Party, suggests that the class nature and the ideological foundation of
the Communist Party should be removed from the Constitution because
these issues should be provided in the Party’s constitution rather than the
148
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State’s Constitution.154
This is actually meant to abolish the
constitutional establishment of Marxist ideology as the dominant
ideology of the polity.
Constitution-makers did receive radical suggestions, but their
debates focused on the accountability of the Party.155 Consequently, the
2013 Constitution rejects the call for a multi-party system and reaffirms
the Party’s leadership and vanguard role in Article 4.156 But, in order to
enhance the legitimacy of this controversial Article and assuage the
forces which sought to introduce greater disharmonies and challenge the
party leadership, it adopts new ambiguous commitments. First, it
stipulates the Party’s accountability to the public in this way: “The
Communist Party of Vietnam maintains a close tie with the People,
serves the People, submits to People’s supervision and is accountable to
the People in its decisions.”157 Second, the Constitution is committed to
the constitutionality and legality of the Party’s actions, providing that:
“All organisations and members of the Communist Party of Vietnam
operate within the framework of the Constitution and the law.”158
However, the Constitution does not articulate mechanisms to hold the
Party accountable to the public and check the constitutionality and
legality of the Party’s power. So, the commitments to the Party’s
accountability and constitutionality, which reflected the public criticism
and demand, are ambiguous and discordant with the persistent mandate
of the Party’s leadership. In particular, the constitutional aspirations of
popular and legal checks on the Party’s power contradict the
constitutional mandate that the Party leadership be subject to the
supervision of the people.
Another important development concerns Article 6 of the
Constitution, which provides that: “The people practice the state power
under the forms of direct democracy and indirect democracy through the
National Assembly, the People’s Councils and other state agencies.”159
This commitment to democracy is dissonant with the constitutionally
established monopolist power of the Party. However, this commitment in
theory allows the people to check the Party’s policies embodied in the
law through their representatives and forms of direct democracy like
referendum.
154
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The condition for the modification to the identity of vanguardism
is that the 1992 Constitution is a disharmonic constitution. First, the fact
that the 1992 Constitution entrenched the leadership of the Communist
Party is at odds with the requirement of constitutional government
created by democratic process, like free and equal election. Second, the
constitutional condition for emergence of dialogue about Article 4 on the
leadership of the Communist Party is in disharmony with the preceding
Article 2. Article 2 confirms the principle of popular sovereignty: “All
power belongs to the people.”160 Third, the gap between constitutional
commitment on party vanguardism and the social reality creates the
opportunity for dialogue about the legitimacy and meaning of Article 4.
The 1992 Constitution removed the confirmation of the “exclusive
leadership” Communist Party, but the single domination of the
Communist Party is the living constitutional norm in Vietnam as there
are not any new parties that can be established. This has also generated
alternative understandings of political competition and multi-party
election, which emerged during the constitutional consultation process.
Moreover, while the Constitution confirms the Party as a vanguard force,
the social reality reveals a discordant picture. In its 2011 XI National
Congress, the Party itself realized the gravity of its actual leadership:
“Our nation has still confronted with numerous great challenges . . . . The
risk of further lagging behind economically compared to many nations in
the region and in the world is apparent. The situation of degradation in
political ideology, morality, and life-style of a negligible part of officials
and party members is serious, which is closely related to the evils of
authoritativeness, corruption, and extravagance.”161 This opened the door
for critical discussion on the legitimacy of Article 4. In reality, the Party
does not merely “lead” the state but interferes in the state’s affairs, which
engenders rethinking about the meaning of party leadership.162
The above constitutional inconsistencies inspire domestic actors to
look at global sources. Several global ideas regarding democratic
government, political accountability, and free and equal elections have
been diffused in Vietnam and have complicated the disharmonic
constitutional discussions on the Party. However, these global ideas are
160

HIẾN PHÁP [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 15, 1992, art. 2 (Viet.).
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[Reforming The Model “The Party Leading the State” in Our Country Today], VIÊN NGHIÊN
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balanced with local conditions and intellectual sources. For example,
domestic corruptions among Party members are important local factors
that drive the discourse of constitutional restraints on the Party’s power.
Moreover, the call for free elections and a multi-party system are justified
by both global norms and the local constitutional legacy concerning the
1946 Constitution which embodied these norms.163
Constitution-making operates as the mechanism for the party, the
state, and the people to engage in a disharmonic constitutional dialogue
to redefine the meaning of party leadership. There is a dialogical
interaction between the socialist specific principle of party vanguardism
and the generic ideas of democracy, free election, and accountability.
Consequently, the identity of party vanguardism remains but is modified
by new commitments to the Party’s accountability and constitutional
restraints on the Party. This adaption to the identity of party
vanguardism is reflective of the new emerging understanding about the
Party’s leadership within Party intellectuals and society. Practically, this
is instrumental to reinforcing the legitimacy of the Party’s leadership.
The continued disharmony internal to Article 4 and the continued gap
between the commitment to the Party’s vanguard and the social reality
(especially serious corruption among Party members) creates continually
shifting dynamics regarding the identity of constitutional vanguardism in
Vietnam.
3.

“Democratic Centralism”

The 1946 Constitution established a Montesquiean tripartite
government, including the Government, People’s Parliament, and an
independent judiciary.164 The socialist Constitutions of 1959, 1980, and
1992 repudiated the western theory of separation of powers in favor of
the Leninist theory of “democratic centralism,” expressed in the
constitutional field as “concentration” or “unity” of power.165 The
Leninist constitutional structure established by the 1992 Constitution
included: the National Assembly, the Government, the President of State,
the people’s courts, and the people’s procucracies. These institutions are
responsible for, and report to, the National Assembly as the supreme
body.166
During the centrally planned period and the early Đổi mới period
in the 1980s, the Leninist constitutional structure in Vietnam had been
163
164
165
166
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construed through the lens of the so-called “socialist concentration of
power,” which holds that state power in socialist Vietnam is concentrated
in the hands of one institution, namely the National Assembly—the
popularly elected legislature—located at the apex of the pyramidal
structure of power while the Government (the executive) is subordinate
to it.167 The reformist discourse in the 2010s, however, moved to employ
the nomenclatures of “unity of power” and “distribution of power.”168
Yet, this is not simply the change of habitual use of phraseology, but
indicates the change of substantial connotations. The alternative
reconstruction of “unity of power” claims that state powers cannot be
centralized in any single institution but are “united at the people” in the
sense that the powers are legitimately emulated from the people and are
exercised for their general interests.169 So, there has been a conceptual
shift from institutional to popular base in legitimatizing unitary power.
The alternative interpretation of unitary power facilitates
institutionally decentralized power, giving rise to the debate on
“distribution of state power” conceived as “the reasonable element” of the
Western theory of the separation of power.170 Constitutional law scholars
call for clearer definition of the National Assembly as the holder of the
legislative power, the Government as the holder of the executive power,
and the courts as the holders of the judicial power, à la Montesquieu.171
This is actually the call for eliminating the concentration of powers
(including the executive and judicial powers) in the hands of the National
Assembly and ensuring the independence of state institutions in
exercising their allocated powers. It bears noting the particular
implication of this constitutional proposal for judicial independence,
167

Nguyễn Xuân Tùng, Tập quyền XHCN: Một học thuyết đã Lỗi thời? [Socialist Concentration
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(amended in 2001)], 8 TẠP CHÍ NHÀ NƯỚC VÀ PHÁP LUẬT 5–6 (2012); Bùi Xuân Đức, Các Quy định về
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which is motivated by the global discourse and practice of judicial power
and judicial review. The mobilization for the real judicial power
practiced by the courts implies that the functions of constitutional
supervision and constitutional interpretation have been misallocated to
the National Assembly and its Standing Committee and should be
reallocated to the judicial site.172
But the most important thing in the 2013 constitutional dialogue on
state power is the call for a new principle of “controlling the state
power,” which mirrors the western principle of checks and balances.173
In the 2000s, Vietnam saw special concerns of “restraining state powers”
or “controlling state power.”174 As the reflection of the practical and
academic demands, the Communist Party in the 11th Convention in 2011
has remarkably introduced the new principle that: “State power is unitary
with distribution, co-ordination, and control among state organs in
exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers.”175 The Party has
accepted the constitutionalist idea of inter-control of the public powers,
an intriguing development of constitutional ideology in a single party
polity like Vietnam. In reflection of the party’s orientation, the
Constitutional Proposal suggests that the future Constitution should
clearly define the mechanism of control among state bodies in exercising
legislative, executive and judicial powers.176 During the time of the
constitution-making processes, various members of the citizenry were
inspired by the endorsement of mechanisms for controlling state bodies
by the party and constitution-makers. Particularly when the draft
constitution was released for public comments, scholars, National
Assembly delegates, and citizens vehemently discussed different
mechanisms for mutual control among the three branches of the state.177
172
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[The Constitution Must be the Document to Control the State Power], TẠP CHÍ KIỂM SÁT,
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To justify the controlling of the state power, some liberal
constitutionalists, such as Nguyễn Đăng Dung, underlined the imperative
to limit arbitrary power and ensure government accountability, generated
by concern for the human inclination to abuse power.178 Other scholars,
such as Trần Ngọc Đường, Đinh Xuân Thảo, and Đào Trí Úc, however,
explain that controlling the state power stems from both negative and
positive impetuses to limit misuse of power, and to promote effective and
efficient state functions.179 This kind of discourse resonated with the
international debate on negative and positive constitutionalism.180
The purpose of controlling state power has been canvassed. Some
liberal constitutionalists emphasized the necessity of protecting
individuals’ rights.181 Others are more concerned with the public
interests, rationalizing that to ensure that the state will practice the
delegated power for their interests, the state power must be controlled.182
Alternative mechanisms for controlling the state power have been
discussed. The legal mechanism for controlling the state power by a
special body of judicial review has also been hotly debated.183 In
addition, a number of political mechanisms have been proposed,
including internal mutual control among state bodies and external
popular controls through election, removal of representatives,
referendum, and the press. This Vietnamese discourse on controlling the

sửa đổi: Vẫn chưa rõ cơ chế kiểm soát quyền lực [Draft Revised Constitution: Mechanisms for
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state power aligns with the international debate on political and legal
constitutionalism.184
Members of the National Assembly also strongly supported the
new principle of controlling state power but were confused about how to
materialize it in the new constitution.185 A delegate agreed that the
incorporation of the new principle of controlling state power is necessary,
but he stated “to control whom” and “how to control” are still open
questions.186 On these questions, another delegate distinguishes internal
and external controls, “[w]e understand that internal control is the control
practiced by state organs and external control is the control practiced by
the people and the society. Basically, the contents of the draft
Constitution have properly expressed this principle.”187 But according to
another delegate, controlling state power means control among the three
state powers: the legislative, executive, and judicial powers.188
Consequently, the new Constitution continues but modifies the
identity of the Leninist centralized constitutional structure. On the one
hand, it continues to reject the Montesquieu principle of separation of
power. This is due to the ideological practice that the party-state adheres
to—using the principle of unity to maintain the socialist identity of the
polity. Moreover, that rejection also has a practical purpose. Although
the Communist Party can play the leading role in the separationist polity,
it rejects the separation of powers because of the practical concern that
separation of powers will invite greater political conflicts, which may
lead to political maelstrom. This is complicated by rumors about internal
conflicts among top political leaders.189 In addition, the separation of
powers may not deprive the Party power as a whole, but may threaten it
in some respects. For example, the Party may lose control of the
judiciary in a separationist polity.
On the other hand, the Constitution introduces new visions
disharmonic with the Leninist unitary constitutional structure. First,
although the Constitution rejects the doctrine of the separation of powers,
it continues the principle of “distribution of power” established by the
184
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1992 Constitution and goes further to employ Montesquieu’s language to
clearly define the public power. For the first time, the Constitution
clearly vests legislative power to the National Assembly, executive
power to the Government, and judicial power to the courts.190 Courts
also feature, for the first time, the constitutional function of protecting
human rights and justice.191 Moreover, judicial independence is
stipulated in the provision that: “The judges and assessors are
independent and shall only obey the law; interference with the trials of
the judges and assessors by bodies, organisations, and individuals is
strictly prohibited.”192 Second, the Constitution introduces the new
principle of mutual control among the three branches of power: “The
state power is unified and distributed to state agencies which coordinate
with and control one another in the exercise of the legislative, executive
and judicial powers”.193 Although constitution-makers could not reach an
agreement about the mechanisms of controlling state power, they
established this as a constitutional principle and let statutes provide
detailed mechanisms.194
Disharmony in the 1992 Constitution led to modification of the
identity of constitutional centralism. First, the principle of unitary power
adopted in this Constitution and its lack of institutional checks and
balances is discordant with the normative requirement of constitutionalist
polity in which power is separated and checked to prevent arbitrariness,
which triggers the debate on distributed and controlled power. Second,
this Constitution adopted competing organizational principles: the
principle of unity of power informed by socialist constitutional thinking
and distribution of powers informed by western doctrine of separation of
power. Yet, distribution of state power has only been enshrined in the
revised 1992 Constitution as a principle and has not yet been reified in
concrete institutional designs. This internal disharmony resulted in
constitutional dialogue in the 2010s regarding a clearer definition and
allocation of the powers of the three state branches. Furthermore, the fact
that the Constitution adopted competing commitments both to the rule of
law (which implies legal restraint on the public power) and unified state
power and party leadership (which conversely implies consolidating
power) provides space for dialogue on distributed and controlled power.
Third, the gap between organizational commitment and reality
encourages dialogue on distributed and controlled power. To illustrate,
190
191
192
193
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while the 1992 Constitution stipulated to distributed power, in reality, the
power is concentrated in the hands of the Party, and the National
Assembly is the forum for the Party to centralize power. This reality
triggers the debate on distributed power, which is in fact meant to
separate the Party power from the state power. The logic is that when the
powers of different state branches are clearly defined, the intervention of
the Party into state activities will be limited, as state agencies will operate
according to their autonomous constitutionally defined spheres. In
addition, the increasing number of serious corruption cases and similar
public power abuses caused considerable popular dissatisfaction,195
which is disharmonic with the constitutional commitment to “combating
against corruption, misspending and all manifestations of bureaucratism,
arrogance, and authoritarianism.”196 The call for controlled power
reflects this social malaise.
Those constitutional disharmonies incentivize different actors to
seek inspiration from global sources. The global ideas of separation of
powers and limited government have been diffused in Vietnam and
induce disharmonic constitutional debates. However, these global ideas
are situated in the local context. The ideas of the separation of powers
and limited power are balanced with the local ideas of unity of powers
and cooperation of powers. Consequently, the public power is both
distributed and concentrated. The National Assembly remains the
supreme body, and independence among the state bodies, including
judicial independence, is not encouraged. The state bodies can mutually
check, but they must cooperate with each other, and such aggressive
mechanisms of checks and balances, such as the ability to veto,
impeachment, and judicial review are not provided.
The constitution-making process allows different actors within the
polity to not only discuss detailed issues pertaining to institutional
design, but also to critically rethink, redefine, and adapt constitutional
postulates fundamental to the overall constitutional structure. The
socialist principle of unitary power remains the hegemonic feature of the
regime, but it is balanced with generic ideas of separated and limited
government. The new Constitution is reflective of the ideational
adjustment to constitutional structure and includes disharmonic
commitments to unitary, distributed, and controlled power, giving rise to
the continuous evolution of the identity of the socialist constitutional
structure.
195

Dien Luong, Vietnam’s Corruption Problem, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb.
http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/vietnams-corruption-problem/.
196
HIẾN PHAP [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 25, 1992, art. 8 (Viet.).

29, 2016),

June 2017

Globalization of Constitutional Identity

4.

505

Rights Statism and Universalism

The generic idea of fundamental rights was diffused in Vietnam
during the early twentieth century.197 The 1946 Constitution guaranteed
fundamental rights familiar in Western constitutions.198 The subsequent
socialist constitutions of 1959, 1980, and 1992 provided even more
generous fundamental rights but under the influence of Marxist and
Soviet rights statism.199
During the Vietnamese constitutional dialogue in the 2010s, the
alternative vision of naturalist human rights emerged, challenging the
statist regime of human rights.200 Constitutional law scholars share the
universalist position that human rights are natural rights recognized and
protected by the state, not rights the state has granted to the citizens.201
Social actors also strongly mobilized for a new human rights regime
consistent with universal standards.202
Importantly, political leadership and constitution-makers also
adopted a universal outlook on human rights. A member of the
Constitutional Amendment Committee told me that the enactment of the
new Constitution is necessary to reflect the state’s new understanding
about human rights, which is that human rights are no longer sensitive
issues and that human rights are different from citizen’s rights.203
Political leaders and constitution-makers agreed that constitutional rights
provisions must be revised in concordance with international human
rights laws.204 The group of constitutional drafters responsible for
197
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drafting the bill of rights even compared word for word to the
Vietnamese bill against the various international human rights treaties
Vietnam has signed to ensure the bill language is consistent with
international obligations.205 When the proposed bill of rights was
presented to the Constitutional Amendment Committee, it was quickly
adopted.206 On January 1, 2013, during the online dialogue between the
Government and the people on the revised draft constitution, which was
released to the public for comments, Vietnamese constitution-makers
explained the universalist view adopted to write new constitutional rights
provisions, stating that: “Sixteen provisions on human rights are
supplemented and applied to everybody residing the territory of Vietnam.
. . . Previously, to talk about human rights was sensitive. Now, the state
considers human rights universal values naturally inherent to human,
which the Vietnamese people have the right to enjoy.”207
Consequently, the 2013 Constitution modified the identity of
human statism. The Constitution attempts to establish a human rights
regime in concordance with universal human rights standards. To
illustrate, Article 14 attempts to dispel the image of statist rights by
providing that human rights in Vietnam “are acknowledged, respected,
and protected in accordance with the Constitution and the law.”208 This
provision tries to demonstrate a cosmopolitan vision of human rights as
natural rights respected by the state, not the rights “provided for” by the
state as in the previous 1992 Constitution.209 Moreover, in a number of
provisions concerning specific individual rights, the subjects of rights are
referred to as “everyone” rather than “citizens” as in the previous
constitutions, indicating that rights are valid not because the subject is a
member of the state but because he or she is a member of the Homo
sapien community. The Constitution also includes new rights in
accordance with international human rights laws, such as the right to life,
the right to presumption of innocence, and the right to live in a healthy
environment.210
The 2013 Constitution also established for the first time the
principle of balancing, “an inherent part of the near-universal general
conception of a constitutional right as an important prima facie claim that
205
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nonetheless can, in principle, be limited or overridden by nonconstitutional rights claims premised on conflicting public policy
objectives.”211 Article 14 provides that: “Human rights and citizens’
rights shall only be restricted when prescribed by statute in imperative
circumstances for the reasons of national defence, national security,
social order and security, social morality and community’s wellbeing.”212 The adoption of this near-universal principle of constitutional
balancing attempts to limit the arbitrary restrictions of human rights by
administrative authorities, which have been subject to domestic and
international criticisms, by mandating that only legislative statutes can
legitimately establish restrictions on human rights for public interests.213
However, this new view contradicts other provisions that stipulated
to a more statist vision of human rights. To illustrate, in contrast to
Article 14 mentioned above, Article 15 tries to establish a statist human
rights regime which reflects local values, providing that: “(1) Citizens’
rights are inseparable from citizens’ duties; (2) Everyone has the duty to
respect the rights of others; (3) Citizens are responsible to practice their
duties to the State and society; (4) The practice of human rights and
citizens’ rights cannot infringe national interests and legal and legitimate
rights and interests of others.”214 The Constitution also requires citizens
to be responsible to the state and prohibits the abuse of rights to infringe
upon the state’s interests.215 Provisions on specific rights often stipulate
that rights must be in accordance with the law, indicating that the rights
are provided and practiced under the state’s regulations.216
So, the identity of right statism remains but is modified by the
incorporation of more universalist outlook on human rights: human rights
of everyone (not only citizens) are acknowledged (not provided) by the
state. This dynamic is animated by the disharmonic human rights regime
established by the 1992 Constitution. To begin with, normatively, this
human rights regime is discordant with international human rights
standards. Constitution-makers did realize that this document failed to
meet international human rights standards.217 This gap is because the
document adopted the statist conception of rights and lacked several
human rights recognized in international human rights law, such as the
right to life. Second, the human rights regime created by the 1992
211

Stephen Gardbaum, A Democratic Defense of Constitutional Balancing, 4 L. & ETHICS OF
HUM. RTS 79 (2010).
212
HIẾN PHAP [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 28, 2013, art.14 (Viet.).
213
Interviews, supra note 16.
214
HIẾN PHAP [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 25, 1992, art. 15 (Viet.).
215
Id.
216
Id. at arts. 22, 23, 25, 27 (1992) (Viet.).
217
Interview, supra note 77.

508

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 26 NO. 3

Constitution included internal contradictions and ambiguity. The 1992
Constitution introduced the concept of human rights for the first time: “In
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, human rights in all respects, political,
civic, economic, cultural and social are respected, find their expression in
the rights of citizens and are regulated by the Constitution and the
law.”218 The ambiguity is that human rights are equated to citizens’
rights regulated by the state.219 The phrase “in concordance with the
law” appeared in most constitutional provisions on citizens’ particular
rights. The Constitution also stipulated inseparability of rights from
duties, and the citizen’s fulfilment of their obligations towards the State
and society.220 So the citizens’ statist rights are discordant with the
constitutional aspiration of human rights. Third, the constitutional
commitment to human rights is discordant with the actual restriction of
human rights, which has been strongly criticized by domestic activists,
foreign governments, and international organizations.221
The gaps between the national human rights regime and
international standards, the ambiguity and contradiction internal to this
regime, and the gap between formal human rights commitments and
actual human rights practices create the condition for different actors to
seek solutions from global sources. Consequently, the globalization of
human rights impacts Vietnamese constitutional identity. Constitutionmakers and social actors resort to international human rights treaties to
redefine the meaning of human rights in Vietnam.
However,
international human rights are situated within the Vietnamese condition
and local specific human rights vision. This generates the continuously
ambiguous human rights regime, which mixes both universal and statist
human rights commitments.
The constitution-making process operates as the mechanism for
different actors in the polity to engage in a dialogue to redefine the rights
identity. In this dialogical forum, the socialist statist principle of rights
and the universal human rights values are disharmoniously interacting.
The consequence is the modification of the statist principle of rights.
Public intellectuals and political leaders expressly state that the new
Constitution indicates a regime’s new self-understanding and
commitment about human rights, which is more universalist.222 The new
218
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Constitution continues to establish a discordant human rights regime, the
condition for the continuous evolution of the identity of constitutional
rights in Vietnam.
5.

Economic Statism and Marketism

Although the 1992 Constitution abandoned the centrally-planned
economy, it confirmed the “leading role” of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) in the economy to ensure its “socialist orientation.”223 This
provision was subjected to critical debate during the constitution-making
process.224
To illustrate, in the National Assembly constitutional debate, some
delegates argued that the confirmation of the leading role of the state
economic sectors contradicts the provision that every economic sector is
equal.225 While many delegates agreed on the leading role of the SOEs:
Many opinions held that, during the last years, the state
economic sectors have received many preferences but have
operated ineffectively. Meanwhile, the private and other
economic sectors are developing robustly, contributing to
the economy, but have been not properly considered.
Therefore, the provision that every economic sector is equal
with the same legal framework will create better
development to the country, create more wealth, jobs, and
contribute more to the national budget.226
A delegate argued that the party’s resolution confirms the leading role of
the SOEs is only valid within five years, while the Constitution has a
/Building-the-Law-governed-Socialist-State/2014/408/The-revised-Constitution-is-the-firm-legal-andpolitical-guarantee-for-the.aspx; Trần Ngọc Đường, Hiến pháp năm 2013: Nhận Thức Mới Về Quyền
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Vũ Hạnh, Hiến pháp: “Kinh tế Nhà nước giữ Vai trò Chủ đạo” [The Constitution: “StateOwned Enterprises Play the Leading Role], VOV.VN (Nov. 5, 2013), http://vov.vn/kinh-te/hien-phapkinh-te-nha-nuoc-giu-vai-tro-chu-dao-289652.vov.
226
Nguyên Thảo, Sửa Hiến pháp: Kinh tế nhà nước không thể chủ đạo? [Amending the
Constitution: State Economy’s Impossibility of the Leading Role?], VNECONOMY (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://vneconomy.vn/thoi-su/sua-hien-phap-kinh-te-nha-nuoc-khong-the-chu-dao20121106021629108.htm.

510

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 26 NO. 3

“higher value.”227 She then concludes: “Whatever we want, the state
economic sectors cannot play the leading role because this is the rule of
development and a reality.”228 Another delegate concurs, stating that the
Constitution has durable effect, and hence should provide for the equality
of every economic sector.229
In addition to the SOEs, land ownership is subject to contentious
debate in the constitution-making process because of its social,
economic, and political consequences.230
The 1992 Constitution
introduced the principle of “the people’s ownership” of land, which
actually means the state is the owner of all land.231 This principle was
subject to critical debate. The most radical proposal—mobilized by
liberal intellectuals, businessmen, and ordinary people—established a
multi-form of land ownership, including both state and private
ownership. Two other moderate proposals focused on the constraints of
the state prerogative powers over land without adopting private
property.232 One proposal called for acquisition with compensation
according to the market price.233 The other petitioned for eliminating the
government’s powers to acquire land for projects of socioeconomic
developments so as to extinguish the root of corruption in land
management of provincial authorities.
The call for privatization of land radically challenges important
instruments of socialist management in Vietnam. It is understandable
that the political leaders have denied the proposal of private property of
land. However, the party and state’s commitment to the constraint of the
state’s authority over land and the enhancement of the quality of the landuse right presents a more liberal movement unconventional to the Soviet
thinking. John Gillespie observes: “The debate so far suggests that party
thinking about land law has continued its incremental shift from the
socialist notion of ‘people’s ownership and state management’ to a more
individualized conception of private proprietary rights.”234
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The 2013 Constitution continues to confirm “socialist-oriented
market economy” as a distinctive attribute of socialist Vietnam. 235 To
promote the market economy, the Constitution continues to include the
commitments to multi-forms of ownership and multi-sectors of economic
structure; equality, cooperation, and competition among all economic
sectors; the protection of private property; and global economic
integration.236 The Constitution includes new commitments to the
encouragement of investment and protection of investors’ capital from
nationalization.237 At the same time, to ensure the “socialist orientation”
of the economy, the Constitution continues to confirm the “leading role”
of the state economic sector, the state’s coordination of the economy, the
state’s ownership of all lands, and the state’s recovery of land used by
organizations and individuals for developmental projects.238
The disharmony concerning the 1992 Constitution animates the
economic dynamics of constitutional identity in Vietnam. First, the fact
that the Constitution provided for the dominant role of the state over
economic resources is discordant with the normative ideals of free market
and private ownership. Second, the 1992 Constitution already included
competing socialist and market commitments: market economy but under
socialist direction, equal competition but under the leading role of the
SOEs, private property rights but state ownership of all lands.
Particularly, the constitutional provision of the “leading role” of the
state’s economic sector is conceived as contradictory to the constitutional
commitment of economic equality and fair corporation and competition,
and this has triggered the call for its elimination.
Third, there is a significant gap between the constitutional
economic commitments and practices.
While the Constitution
established the SOEs as the leading force of the economy, losses and
corruption at state corporations were significant.239 Besides that, the
contribution of the state economic sector has considerably declined. To
illustrate, within ten years (2000–2010), the contribution of the state
economic sector to the national budget was less than 20%, significantly
lower than that of the private sectors. In addition, state enterprises’
contribution to GDP declined to 19% in the period 2006–2009, whereas
235
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private sectors contributed at double that rate. Moreover, the rate of
creating new jobs in state economic sectors decreased to negative 22%,
which means that state enterprises have cut jobs down rather than created
new labors.240
Similarly, while the constitutional aspiration of “people’s
ownership of lands” is benevolent, to prevent capitalists’ agglomeration
of lands and to ensure the use of lands for socialist collective goals, the
reality is different. Commentators have pointed out that the state, under
the name of public goals, has expropriated people’s fields to benefit
individual authorities without offering sufficient compensation.241 The
corruption in land acquisition and land allocation, other types of
mismanagement of land, and the limits of the courts in dealing with land
disputes have resulted in mass demonstrations, numerous collective
petitions, and violent clashes between the farmers and the authorities. 242
The ambiguity and disharmony of the socialist constitutional
economy, both internally and externally, have created the opportunity for
solutions through the use of global sources. A member of the
Constitutional Amendment Committee and of the group of constitutional
drafters responsible for drafting the Constitution’s chapter on economic
and social principles told me that their intention is to create a chapter
meeting with the (global) “standards of a market economy.”243 The
global ideas of market economy and private property have been diffused
in Vietnam and are balanced with the Vietnamese reality and local statist
economic vision, which results in the mixture of both market and
socialist elements in the constitutional economy. Similarly, the party and
state’s thinking about land ownership also presents a shift to a more
individualist conception of private proprietary rights but seeks to balance
it with the conventional collective conception.
The constitution-making process provides the forum for different
actors within the Vietnamese polity to rethink and redefine the ideational
foundation of the constitutional economy. The socialist economic statism
is balanced with economic marketism. Consequently, the state-owned
economy remains essential to the Vietnamese constitutional polity, but is
240
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adapted by adopting new liberal and market ideas. The socialist identity
of economic statism is modified by the commitment to “socialist market
economy” in which the state still controls the economy, but private
property rights are guaranteed, private enterprises can develop, and some
limits on the state economic power are possible. Examples include
privatization of the state-owned enterprises and the transparent process of
acquisition and compensation of lands. Thus, the 2013 Constitution
establishes a disharmonic constitutional economy, facilitative to the
continuous evolution of the socialist identity of economic statism.
6.

Consequence

A member of the Constitutional Amendment Committee told me
that in the new Constitution substantial principles remain but are
understood with “new ways and new spirit” suitable to the “new
context.”244 This captures the adaptions to socialist constitutional identity
in Vietnam.
Moreover, the new constitutional commitments have begun to
inform constitutional practices. To illustrate, following the commitment
to constitutional referendum and direct democracy, the National
Assembly enacted the Law on Referendum November 25, 2015,
finalizing the restraints on the party-state and amendments to the
Constitution.245 But how this law is implemented remains to be seen. In
addition, consistent with the commitment to state constitutionality,
constitutional oaths have been taken twice in Vietnam since the passage
of the new Constitution.246 Constitutional oaths may raise the political
leaders’ awareness of the relevance of the constitution to their activities.
In addition, new constitutional commitments to distribute and
control power have been realized to some extent. The National
Assembly has revised a number of organic laws to make them consistent
with the new Constitution, including: Law on Organization of the
National Assembly (2014); Law on Organization of the Government
(2015); Law on Organization of the People’s Courts (2014); and Law on
Organization of the People’s Procucracies (2014). These laws do not
merely repeat the constitutional provisions but go on to further clarify the
244
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distribution of power. Moreover, these constitutional laws have had
some developments with regards to controlling state power, such as
strengthening the deputies’ right to interpellation of government
members and the role of the National Assembly’s Legal Committee in
constitutional supervision.247 They have also helped emphasize the
independence of the government to practice its executive power and
clarified the personal authority and responsibility of the Prime Minister
and ministers.248 Furthermore, the laws have strengthened judicial
independence by, for example, extending the judges’ terms to ten years,
stipulating to adversarial trials, and establishing the role of the Supreme
Court in developing precedents, which reflects the influence of the
common law tradition.249 Finally, the laws have developed mechanism to
control state power through stipulating the mutual checks between the
courts and the procuracies.250
Similarly, following the new constitutional commitments to human
rights, a number of legislative acts regarding human rights have been
revised. The Minister of Justice states that there are thirty-six legislative
acts needing revision or replacement in concordance with the new
Constitution.251 The new requirement that human rights can only be
limited by statutes puts strong pressure on government regulations.252
This means the government cannot issue decrees that limit human rights.
The Constitution also puts pressure on the National Assembly’s lawmaking activities. National Assembly deputies now have a strong
concern for how to make sure their legislations are consistent with new
constitutional rights provisions.253
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That has some positive impacts. For example, the new Civil Code,
Penal Code, and Criminal Procedure Code have been revised with new
developments regarding human rights, which helps indicate the
universalist vision. To illustrate, the new Civil Code adopted in 2015
recognizes transgender rights, minimizes the intervention of
administrative authorities in civil transactions, and forces the courts to
hear civil complaints even in case of absence of applicable law. 254 The
Penal Code excludes the application of death penalty to “under-18
offenders, pregnant women and women who are nursing children under
36 months or those who are more than 75 years old when they commit a
crime or are put into trial.”255 The Code also abolishes the death penalty
for seven crimes: surrendering to the enemy, opposing order, destruction
of projects of national security importance, robbery, drug possession,
drug appropriation, and the production and trade of fake food.256 This
development is consistent with the Constitution’s new recognition of the
right to life. The Criminal Procedure Code recognizes the right to
silence, the detainees’ “right to have legal assistance of lawyers before
making any statement,” and requires “audio and video recording during
interrogation” to prevent “torture and other cruel treatments by police
investigators.”257
Yet, the above codes also echo the constitutional disharmony
regarding human rights. The Civil Code continues the communitarianstatist vision of rights, evident by its emphasis on its role in protecting
not only the interests of the individuals but also the interests of the state
and the community. The Penal Code more clearly shows its statist vision
when it “maintains controversial articles with severe punishments against
government critics and human rights activists.”258 Dissidents had
petitioned for removing the offence of “propaganda against the state,” as
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this violates the constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech.259
This offense continues to be a feature in the new Penal Code.
Last but not least, new economic constitutional commitments have
begun to inform the reality. For example, the Government has
implemented the policies of equitization or privatization of the stateowned enterprises.260 The new Land Law, effective July 2014, has some
developments respecting the larger right to use land and a more
transparent process of acquisition and compensation.261
New constitutional commitments and principles in the 2013
Constitution shape the scope, potential, and constraints of political, legal,
and economic reforms in Vietnam. But, the constraints are not very
strict, and there is ample space for the continuing dynamics of socialist
constitutional identity in Vietnam. First, this is because the 2013
Constitution is a disharmonic constitution. Many ideas and principles
newly introduced in the Constitution are broad and ambiguous, such as
constituent power by the people, constitutional referendum, controlling
the state power, and legislative constitutional review, thus opening the
door for alternative constructions. Moreover, the disharmonic gap
between the Constitution and global constitutionalism (for example, party
leadership vs. free election, unitary vs. separated power, statist vs.
universal rights, the legislative vs. judicial constitutional review) creates
the condition for continuous change in the socialist constitutional
identity. In addition, the disharmony between the Constitution and the
social reality is facilitative of the continuing evolution of the socialist
constitutional identity. Most notably, constitutional aspirations to
“prosperous people” and “that all people enjoy an abundant, free, and
happy life with conditions for comprehensive development,”262 are
discordant with the fact that Vietnam is still a middle income country,263
replete with serious social problems, such as a polluted environment,
social inequality, an underdeveloped education system, terrible
transportation system, and the like. The aspiration to the “socialist rule
of law state” has been discordant with the social reality of corruption,
259
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miscarriages of justice, and ineffectiveness of law enforcement.264 Also,
the constitutional commitment to protect universal human rights is
disharmonic with the functional human rights regime in which rights are
constricted for statist purposes. These constitutional disharmonies
continue to offer space for, and incentives to looking at global sources
and animate the continuing shifts in constitutional identity in Vietnam.
In the near future, as judicial review is absent and the constitutionmaking process is not available, constitutional dynamics in Vietnam may
be limited; however, these dynamics may proceed in popular and
political forums. In fact, in these popular and legislative platforms, social
and institutional actors have continued to engage in dialogues on the
constitutional referendum, the popular checks of the party power,
mechanisms to control the state powers, the protection of human rights,
and the constraints of the state power over the economy. 265 Global
constitutional ideas still inform this dialogue and are situated with the
local reality and interact with local ideas.

IV.

COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

The experience in four other socialist countries (China, Laos,
North Korea, and Cuba) also indicates that there are adaptive changes to
the socialist constitutional identity. A comprehensive exploration of
these changes is beyond the scope of this single article. Instead, I will
briefly discuss the important trends with a focus on the post-Soviet era.
A.
264
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The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has enacted five
constitutions in 1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982 under the leadership of the
Communist Party of China (CPC). The current 1982 Constitution was
revised several times in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004.266 Jianfu Chen
captures the instrumentalist nature of China’s Constitution in these
words: “The Constitution in China has been in a constant state of flux,
reflecting changes in the CPC leadership and in its policies about the kind
of the future society envisaged.”267 Constitution-making in China is
under strict party control and significantly lacks public participation.
According to Jianfu Chen, only in the last constitutional revision (2003–
2004) was the ongoing revision process officially reported, but even
academic discussions on constitutional revision issues were closed down
by the Party.268
However, there is initial evidence indicating that this identity has
been modified by quasi-constitutionalist understanding. During the postSoviet period, like in Vietnam, the idea of constitutionalism together with
generic elements has played a dominant role in the Chinese constitutional
intellectual life.269 Although the political leaders rejected the global ideas
of constitutionalism, they adopted a new understanding about the nature
and role of the constitution, which somewhat reflects the generic
constitutionalist spirit.
The constitutional amendment in 2009
incorporated a new principle called “Ruling the Country According to the
Law,” the Chinese version of socialist rule of law state.270 Following
this, in the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the Party suggested a discordant
understanding: “As the Constitution and laws are adopted by the Party
and the people under its leadership,” “the Party must act within the scope
prescribed by the Constitution and laws.”271 As Heike Holbig comments,
“On the one hand, this passage seems to signal the willingness of the
party to exercise its power only within the confines of the constitutional
and legal framework, but on the other, the CCP is also clearly asserting
its claim to be the originator of the constitution, and thus implicitly, the
authority in control of the constitution.”272 On July 1, 2015, the nation’s
legislature adopted a bill requiring government officials to pledge
266
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allegiance to the nation’s Constitution upon taking office.273 So, China,
like Vietnam, has begun to establish a culture of constitutional oath,
although this is not a requirement stipulated to in the constitution as is the
case in Vietnam.
Although China’s Constitution retains its instrumentalist nature, it
also operates as the framework for constitutionalism debate and even for
Chinese citizens to struggle for realization of their constitutional rights.274
Thus, constitutional instrumentalism remains the dominant feature of the
Chinese constitutional order, but is adjusted with new constitutionalist
consciousness and practice, indicative of inchoate constitutionalism.
In addition to instrumentalism, party vanguardism is a core of the
Chinese constitutional polity, but it is also adaptively changed. The
current 1982 Constitution of China refers to the leadership of the CPC in
its preamble rather than expressly mandating this in a constitutional
provision, as did the 1975 and 1978 Constitutions.275 Although this
change does not alter the nature of the party leadership, it moderates this
nature and leaves space for multiparty system.
In fact, party
vanguardism is adapted in the Chinese context by the local specific
system called “multi-party cooperation and political consultation
system.”276 In China, there are eight democratic parties operating under
the control of the CPC. They do not oppose the CPC and the regime.
The basic principle is that “The CPC is the only party in power in the
People’s Republic of China while under the precondition of accepting the
leadership of the CPC, the eight other political parties participate in the
discussion and management of state affairs, in cooperation with the
CPC.”277 The Constitution’s preamble confirms the commitment that:
“The system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by
the Communist Party of China will exist and develop in China for a long
time to come.”278 This commitment is embodied in practice by the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences through which the
CPC consults other parties on national affairs.279 Another practical
embodiment is the appointment of members of democratic parties to
273
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government posts.280 Thus, the essence of the vanguard role of the CPC
remains but is adapted by the aspirational principle of multi-party
cooperation and political consultation.
Another adaption to the Chinese constitutional vanguardism is
related to Jiang Zemin’s “three represents” doctrine. One of the three
elements is that the Party represents “the development trends of advanced
productive forces.”281 The implication is that capitalists are not enemies
of Chinese socialism. The practical embodiment of this “new thinking”
is the invitation of “capitalists” to join the CPC.282 So, the party
vanguardism remains the dominant feature but is adjusted by “new
thinking” that allows the pragmatic incorporation of alternative social
forces into the communist party. The constitutional commitment to a
multiparty system, but under the exclusive leadership of one communist
Party, creates the disharmonic condition for the continuing dynamics of
constitutional vanguardism in China.
On constitutional structure, an Article of China’s 1982
Constitution confirms that: “The State organs of the People’s Republic of
China apply the principle of democratic centralism.”283 Democratic
centralism is connected with the proletarian dictatorship. The supremacy
of the National People’s Congress is a political form of “the people’s
democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the
alliance of workers and peasants.”284 The separation of power, judicial
review, and judicial independence are rejected in this centralized and
dictatorial constitutional arrangement.
But, within the community of Chinese constitutional intellectuals,
separatism is the prevailing model of constitutional thought.
For
example, like the 2013 constitutional debate in Vietnam, the essential
spirit of pro-constitutionalist arguments in China’s 2013
constitutionalism debate is defined by fundamental aspirations of generic
constitutionalism, including the aspiration of a separationist
government.285 The party-state, however, rejects the doctrine of the
separation of powers. Democratic centralism remains the core value of
the Chinese constitutional polity, but is adjusted to the new context. The
party-state in China as well as in Vietnam does not reject an
understanding of distribution of the public power. But different from
280
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Vietnam, the idea of distribution of power in China is substantively
articulated, not through formal constitution-making, but legislation.286
More prominent adaption to the socialist principle of democratic
centralism concerns vertical governmental relations, evidenced by the
concepts of regional autonomy, “Special Economic Zones”, and Special
“Administrative Region,” or “one country, two systems” (OCTS).287
Such pragmatic adjustment creates discordant concepts and principles.
For example, Albert Chen argues that: “The story of the debate on and
struggle for universal suffrage in Hong Kong thus reveals such
underlying tensions behind, and the contradictions inherent in, the very
concept and practice of ‘OCTS.’”288 In other words, constitutional
dynamics in Hong Kong are engendered by the disharmony internal to
the aspiration of OCTS.
China’s 1982 Constitution also includes rights provisions in the
spirit of socialist statism. The Constitution establishes the principle of
unity of rights and duties.289 The practice of rights is limited by the state
and collective interests.290 Yet, China has adapted its understanding of
rights, evident by the incorporation of the idea of “human rights” in the
Constitution through the 2004 constitutional amendment. Chen
comments: “China has now finally come to accept universal, rather than
insisting on an ‘Asian’ or ‘Chinese’ conception of human rights.”291 This
reconceptualization of human rights has practical implications: “The
scope of human rights could be interpreted to include not only the
fundamental rights as codified in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, but also
those contained in at least the two International Covenants and other
international human rights treaties that China has agreed to abide by.”292
Thus, rights statism remains the dominant feature of the Chinese
constitutional polity, but is adapted by more universalist understanding.
Finally, economic statism remains at the core of the Chinese
constitutional economy, but is also adjusted with new understanding.
The ideas of “socialist public ownership of the means of production”,
“State-owned economy” as “the leading force in the national economy”,
286
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and state and collective ownership of land are all constitutionally
confirmed.293 But Dengism has adopted a pragmatic approach to the
socialist economy, leading to the practice of the opening and reforming
of policy. The fundamental aspiration of the Chinese party-state is to
build “socialism with Chinese characteristics” or “Chinese style of
socialism.”294 This has resulted in the adjustment to the identity of
economic statism by adapting liberal economic principles.
Consequently, the Constitution is committed to a “socialist market
economy,” “diverse sectors of the economy developing side by side,” the
land use right, and inviolable lawful private property.295 These
fundamental commitments have actually informed the Chinese
constitutional economy, as economic dynamics in the country in the last
three decades indicate.296 Thus, the Constitution confirms the socialist
economy but at the same time adopts capitalist economic elements,
creating the disharmonic condition for the continuing development of the
identity of a Chinese constitutional economy.
China’s 1982 Constitution together with its amendments is a
disharmonic constitution. It includes internal discordant provisions
regarding the party leadership, constitutional supremacy, constitutional
structure, rights, and economy. This internal disharmony, together with
the gap between the socialist constitutional ideals, the Chinese society
and general constitutional ideas, constitutes the condition for the
continuing dynamics of socialist constitutional identity. This condition
is caused by China’s speed of economic development, the emergence of
new social groups and their mobilization, and the impact of
globalization.297 Constitutional identity has changed through formal
constitution-making and amendment.
Chinese constitutional
exceptionalism (political elite’s distinctive doctrines) defines the extent
to which socialist constitutional identity is modified in China.
B.

Laos

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) is another socialist
country in the contemporary world. Laos goes even farther than China
to amend the core of socialist constitutional identity. The communist Lao
293
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People’s Revolutionary Party seized power in 1975, abolishing the royal
government’s 1947 Constitution, which in turn succeeded the first 1945
Constitution of the Lao Issara (Free Lao) Government.298 The Party
Secretary General Kaysone stated that the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic should “urgently undertake the major task . . . of preparing a
socialist constitution at an early date.”299 But it was not until 1991 that
the Supreme People’s Assembly, the nation’s legislative body, enacted
the socialist constitution.300 This charter “was strongly influenced by the
socialist Constitutions of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the People’s
Republic of Kampuchia.”301 The constitution-making process was under
the Party’s control.302 The 1991 Constitution was amended in 2013,
effectively leading to its replacement by the 2013 Constitution. The
Constitution was recently amended in 2015 to “respond to the Party’s
renovation policies and the country’s development vision until 2030.”303
While the instrumentalist nature of Laos’ Constitution remains, it
is modified by the involvement of the public in the constitution-making
process. In this regard, Laos is distant from China and closer to Vietnam.
The draft constitution was published in 1990 in a Party journal for public
discussion and mobilization, albeit under party control.304 Public
participation in the 2015 constitutional amendment process is also
striking. “Leaders, senior revolutionary combatants, retired officials,
civil servants, technical officials, soldiers, police officers, intellectuals,
and ordinary people of all classes” had been encouraged to submit
proposals for the constitutional amendment.305 A series of seminars were
held in regions across the country where policymakers shared their views
“in order to draw up the draft.”306 Public participation is the base for the
claim in the preamble that: “This Constitution is the fruit of the process
of the people's discussions throughout the country.”307 Thus, the
instrumentalist aspiration is moderated by the public participation in
constitution-making.
298
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Laos’ Constitution also mandates the Lao People’s Revolutionary
Party (LPRP) as the “leading nucleus” of political system.308 But, after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the communist ideology of LPRP has
been considerably eroded, except the principle of the party’s monopoly
of political power.309 The erosion of communist ideology has resulted in
other constitutional variations in Laos. In regards to structure, the
Constitution establishes that: “The National Assembly and other state
organizations are established and function in accordance with the
principle of democratic centralism.”310 But the delineation of the three
state branches “do not imitate any particular model (neither Vietnamese,
nor Russian, nor French), but it pays respect to the idea of a basic
blueprint of responsibilities lodged in designed institutions.”311 Perhaps,
the most notable adaption to “democratic centralism” is the pragmatic
practice of political decentralization which allows local governments to
enjoy great autonomy. This is due in part to “the limited resources and
poor communication” with the central government and in part to the
central government’s incentive to “encourage local government to
establish direct contacts with the boarders with China, Thailand, and
Vietnam, and trading agreements with neighboring jurisdictions.”312
The Constitution also includes a list of fundamental rights whose
practice is “provided by the laws” or “not contrary to the laws.”313
Laotian citizens are constitutionally required “to respect the Constitution
and the laws, to observe labor discipline, [and to comply with] the
regulations relating to social life and public order.”314 The practice of
rights depends on the state’s regulatory laws, but there is no institutional
mechanism for the citizens to question the constitutionality of the laws
regulating their rights. This reserves the core of statist rights. But
fundamental rights established in Laos’ Constitution are adaptive to the
local context and seem more liberal and less statist than those in China
and Vietnam. The restriction of rights in the name of state interests is not
explicitly established in the Constitution. Moreover, recent constitutional
amendments prohibit “all forms of bureaucratic threats and actions that
undermine the physical and mental wellbeing or the dignity of the
people,” and “actions that cause damage to their rightful assets,” ensure
“solidarity and equal rights among the multiethnic people,” protect
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intellectual property rights and the rights of foreign nationals in Laos and
of those who have no nationality.315
On the economy, the Constitution also provides for the state’s
centralized management of the economy and land as “a national
heritage,” which citizens are granted to use by the state.316 But, the
Constitution is committed to a “market economy,” albeit “regulated by
the state in the direction of socialism.” 317 Commentators indicate that
“the chapter on the socioeconomic system does not mention the
establishment of socialism, a principal goal of earlier dogma.” 318 Instead,
the main goal of the national economy is to “transform the natural
economy into a trading and manufacturing economy.”319 On this base,
the Constitution underlines the commitments to the promotion of
domestic and foreign investment, protection of “lawful assets and capital
of investors” from state confiscation, seizure, or nationalization, and
protection and promotion of “all forms of property rights.”320
Socialist constitutional identity in Laos is unique. It is determined
by the complex history of communism in the country, domestic ethnic
diversity, the undeveloped economy, and the country’s international
relationship with its neighbors—China, Vietnam, and Thailand—and the
western world.321 The current trend seems to indicate that Laos does not
strictly adhere to the socialist constitutional ideology, except the idea of
party leadership. Ideological relaxation allows Laos to freely amend the
socialist constitutional identity without abandoning its core. The fall of
the Soviet Union was an important external factor that created the erosion
of communist ideology in Laos. But, the erosion is, perhaps principally,
determined by the local condition. Specifically, poverty and economic
difficulty make socioeconomic transformation, rather than ideological
commitments, the political elites’ preoccupation. Consequently, there is
a significant disharmony between the adherence to socialist ideals and the
real imperative of socioeconomic development, and the Laos
constitutional polity tends to favor reality over ideals.
The national goal established in the constitutional preamble is
generic rather than specifically socialist, namely “the objective of
315
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building Laos into a country of peace, independence, democracy, unity
and prosperity.”322 This objective is considered “the long-standing
aspirations and strong determination of the national community.”323 The
commitment to a community’s self-determination allows the people to
participate in the constitution-making process as moderators of socialist
constitutional instrumentalism. The justification of party vanguardism in
Laos is “to defend the national interest or fight for the interests and
aspiration of the people,”324 which is more nationalist and populist and
less relevant to the socialist objectives. But, most importantly, the
paramount concern of the Constitution is economic development, which
is less meant to idealistically transform into socialism than to realistically
“improve the material and spiritual living conditions of the multi-ethnic
people.”325 The Constitution attempts to realize this through a strong
commitment to the promotion of investment and protection of investors’
property and rights.
Laos offers an example of how national
constitutions are used to attract foreign investments in the globalizing
era.326 But, social and economic improvement and the aspiration to
attract foreign investment seem to be the dominant sprit of the whole
Constitution of Laos, not merely the chapter on socioeconomic system.
The Constitution seemingly tries to distance itself from specific socialist
language and adopts more generic constitutional norms, especially
fundamental rights, to communicate with the rest of the world where
socialist polity is a minority.
Consequently, Laos’ Constitution is a disharmonic constitution.
The internal disharmony concerns: the generic aspiration and the
principle of the communist party as the core of the polity; “democratic
centralism” and political decentralization; the market economy and the
state’s direction to socialism; and rights granted and controlled by the
state but also limiting authority’s arbitrariness. Externally, there is a
considerable gap between the constitutional commitment to
socioeconomic improvement, and even prosperity, and the real poverty
and economic difficulty. Moreover, the Constitution is also discordant
with many generic constitutional aspirations like free elections, universal
rights, and constitutional review. These constitutional disharmonies are
created by several factors, including: the post-Soviet experience and the
continuing aspirations of socioeconomic transition; and the incentive to
engage in the global market. These constitutional disharmonies are the
322
323
324
325
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conditions for the continuing transition of the constitutional identity in
Laos.
C.

North Korea

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea,
is a socialist country, but an aberrant case.
Under the rule of the
communist Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), North Korea has six
constitutions enacted in 1948, 1972, 1992, 1998, 2009, and 2012. 327 The
instrumentalist nature of the constitution is embodied strongly in North
Korea. Darren C. Zook remarks: “Each of the Constitutions of North
Korea has emerged out of transformative moments when cumulative
political change necessitated a corresponding legal expression to
legitimate and articulate the new orientation and outlook of the state.”328
But the unique manifestation of socialist constitutional instrumentalism
in North Korea is the fact that the Constitution is instrumental to personal
communist rule. Successive constitutions were adopted to legitimize the
authority of successive leaders: Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong
Un. The recent constitutional amendment in 2016 enabled Kim Jong Un
to become an absolutist national leader. According to Rodong Sinmun, a
North Korean newspaper, “[In] order to arrange the strong legal
groundwork for the path towards the socialist powerhouse, to be lead
[sic] by Kim Jong Un’s monolithic leadership, we are to review and
adopt the amendment of DPRK’s socialist constitution.”329
North Korea’s Constitution confirms the core of the socialist
constitutional identity, namely the leadership of the communist party,
centralized power, statist rights, and statist economy. 330
These
constitutional principles do inform constitutional politics in North
Korea.331 But the fall of communism in the post-Soviet era led North
Korea to abandon any reference to the Soviet constitutional values and
Marxism-Leninism, and to develop its own modus operandi of socialism.
The ideological principle called juche (self-reliance) was constitutionally
confirmed as the guiding principle of the regime.332 This principle,
which stresses economic, political, and military independence and self327
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reliance, has resulted in North Korea’s constitutional isolationism. A
related ideological principle is seongun sasang (military first ideology),
which aspires to create combination of political and military rule.333 The
2016 constitutional amendment, which creates a new body called
Commission on State Affairs headed by Kim Jong Un and enables him to
enjoy leadership roles in the military, party, and government, is the
embodiment of the constitutional seongun principle.334
North Korea is a negative example of the dynamics of socialist
constitutional identity.
The fundamental aspiration underpinning
constitutional isolationism and domestic military ideology—the purity of
socialism—inhibits the emergence of competing constitutional
understandings. Therefore, the condition for the development of socialist
constitutional identity in North Korea is limited. This limitation of the
disharmonic condition is due to economic difficulty, which inhibits the
emergence of a pluralist society, and the isolationism, which limits the
diffusion of global constitutional ideas in North Korea.
However, North Korea has been confronted with economic
difficulty, which necessarily prompts constitutional change.
The
disharmony between the constitutional isolationist aspiration and the
aspiration of economic development and foreign investment has created
the opportunity for growth of North Korea’s constitutional economy. To
be sure, North Korea does not have a systematic vision of market reforms
like those of China and Vietnam. But, a moderate modification of the
state-owned economy was undertaken through the Joint Venture Act of
1984, effectively a constitutional law that allowed economic cooperation
between North Korean industry and foreign enterprises. The 1992
Constitution then legitimized foreign trade and foreign investment and
joint venture enterprises.335
The current Constitution continues the commitment that: “The
State shall encourage institutions, enterprises and organizations in our
country to joint ventures and cooperation of enterprise with foreign
corporations and individuals as well as the establishment and operation of
a variety of enterprise in special economic zones.”336 The Constitution is
also committed to “guarantee the legal rights and interests of foreigners
in its region.”337 In addition, there are also constitutional commitments to
the protection of private property, and even copyrights, inventions, and
333
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patents.338 North Korean citizens “could now earn money from private
economic activities, and the fruits of their economic activities.”339 The
economic
constitutional
commitments
have
been
initially
340
implemented. Particularly, “under Kim Jong Un, Chinese-style private
farming has been encouraged and large numbers of North Koreans have
been sent to China to study its reform experience.”341 This adoption of
new constitutional economic commitments enables the identity of
constitutional economy in North Korea to evolve albeit under the tight
control of the state.
The constitutional disharmony between the constitutional principal
of juche (self-reliance) and commitment to foreign investment, as well as
economic development, present an opportunity for the evolution of
constitutional identity in North Korea. Dae-kyu Yoon comments: “If an
open-door policy is the inevitable option to overcome the country’s
current economic difficulty, the rule of law will be one of the most
important vehicles to persuade foreigners to trust the system and
economic co-operation.”342 Moreover, the imperative of economic
development and foreign investment necessarily leads to the impact of
globalization on the constitutional identity in North Korea, which is
discordant with the aspiration to constitutional isolationism. 343 This may
create the potential condition for North Korea’s transnational
constitutional engagement, which would engender the continuing
dynamics of constitutional identity.
D.

Cuba

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Cuba has
continued the communist regime but has also needed to acclimate itself
to a new context. The Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Communista
de Cuba, PCC) met in October 1991 to consider the consequence of the
collapse of the communist world to Cuba.344 In the meeting, the Party
decided to revise the nation’s 1976 Constitution to adapt. “The
leadership closely controlled the process of constitutional revision, and
338
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the PCC and the National Assembly committees carried out the task.”345
The constitutional amendments were approved in July 1992 by the Party
and the National Assembly.346 The Constitution was amended again in
2002 to confirm that socialism is irrevocable.347 Thus, instrumentalism
remains the core feature in Cuban constitutional polity.
The Constitution also confirms the common core of the socialist
constitutional identity. Article 5 mandates: “The Communist Party of
Cuba, Martian and of Marxist-Leninist, the organized vanguard of the
Cuban nation, is the superior leading force of the society and the
State.”348 The principle of “democratic centralism” is modified as
“socialist democracy,” but the substantial meaning remains the same.
The constitutional structure includes the National Assembly as “the
supreme organ of State power”349 and other institutions (the Council of
State, the Council of Ministers, and courts) subordinate to the former. 350
Constitutional rights are provided,351 but its practice must conform to
“the goals of a socialist society.”352 The centrally planned economy and
state’s ownership of land are constitutionally confirmed.353
However, the Constitution adopts some adaptive changes as a
response to the fall of the communist bloc. Fundamental national goals
are redefined to be more inclusive rather than exclusively socialist. The
constitutional preamble established “sociopolitical ideas of Marx, Engels,
and Lenin” as the guiding principles, but now also follows “ideology of
José Martí.”354 Consequently, the Constitution established a commitment
to achieve José Martí’s strong desire: “I want the fundamental law of our
republic to be the tribute of Cubans to the full dignity of man.” 355 Article
1 then establishes the regime’s constitutional commitment to serving “the
good of all.”356 Moreover, the new Article 55 eliminated the Marxist idea
of “scientific materialism” and incorporates a new commitment to
respecting and guaranteeing freedom of conscience and religion.357
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But, like North Korea, Cuba is a negative example of socialist
constitutional identity change. Larry Catá Backer argues that the PCC is
the center of political and economic reform in Cuba.358 While the
communist parties in China, Vietnam, and Laos have tried to become the
ruling party looking forward to attain developmental goals, the
communist party in Cuba has remained a revolutionary party looking
retrospectively “to reserve the communist society achieved at the
moment of revolutionary triumph.”359 Reservationism and “ossification
of Cuban Marxism-Castroism” inhibit the emergence of discordant
constitutional visions, which in turn limits the dynamics of constitutional
identity.360 The ossified ideological foundation makes the constitutional
polity in Cuba remain deeply Leninist.
However, like North Korea, Cuba has to deal with economic
difficulties and hence the constitutional economy has been adapted for
this purpose. Unlike China, Vietnam, and Laos, Cuba has rejected the
marketization of the economy and has maintained the centrally planned
economy dominated by state-owned enterprises.361 While private
enterprises are not allowed, the Constitution allows the establishment of
“mixed enterprises, and by economic partnerships and associations” and
is committed to protect their property,362 which, like North Korea, is
meant to attract foreign investments.363 Following the constitutional
aspiration of foreign investment, a new law on foreign investment was
adopted in 2014, but its implementation regulations depended on the state
actors’ multi-level review and approval due to the ideological constraints
of economic statism.364 Thus, revolutionary reservationism is discordant
with the constitutional aspiration to foreign investment and the actual
need of socioeconomic transition.
This moderate disharmonic
constitutional condition, the imperative of social and economic
transition,365 and the possible global engagement366 (particularly
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transnational dialogue with China),367 constitute potential elements of the
dynamics of socialist constitutional identity in Cuba.
B.

Comparative Reflections

The general trend shared among the five socialist countries is that
core elements of socialist constitutional identity have remained, but
adapted to acclimate to the globalizing world. After the collapse of the
Soviet bloc, all five countries had to address economic and institutional
reform. This necessarily required adjustment to constitutional ideas and
principles foundational to the polity. Constitution-making is the main
mechanism through which socialist constitutional identity change takes
place. The change involves the dialogical interaction between socialist
constitutional identity and global constitutional identity. All five
countries have pragmatically referenced, incorporated, and redefined
some ideas and principles of generic constitutionalism, albeit with
different levels. Consequently, all five operating socialist constitutions
are disharmonic to varying degrees allowing for the continuous
development of socialist constitutionalist identity.
There are at least two factors explaining that convergence. First,
globalization compels socialist countries to adapt their constitutional
identity. Constitutional globalization is inevitable, and the Vietnamese
story has indicated how this affects the dynamics of socialist
constitutional identity.368 Laos is more willing to engage in global
constitutional dialogue, mainly due to the national economy’s heavy
reliance on foreign investment. Despite constitutional exceptionalism
which contributes to China’s resistance to global constitutionalism, China
has also signed major international human rights treaties and
incorporated the ideas of human rights and property rights into the
nation’s constitution. Despite North Korea’s isolationism and Cuba’s
reservationism, the imperative of economic development and foreign
investment are the driving forces of at least modest global constitutional
engagement.
The second factor concerns transnational engagement within the
five socialist countries. There are actual signs that they have engaged in
dialogue to share their experiences and visions of change. To illustrate,
Dwight H. Perkins indicates that: “The leaders of Vietnam certainly
knew about and learned from the reform experiences of China that

367
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preceded their reform effort.”369 Laos’s dialogical engagement with
Vietnam is also one of the reasons for its adoption of the idea of socialist
market economy.370 As mentioned above, North Korea and Cuba have
also engaged in dialogue with China on reforming issues.
Yet, there is divergence in socialist constitutional identity adaption
among the five countries. The constitutional identity adaption in
Vietnam is perhaps the most far-reaching among the five countries,
evident by the bold constitutional commitments to popular constituent
power, constitutional referendum, the party under the Constitution,
distributed and controlled power, and universal human rights. Vietnam,
China, and Laos have adapted to all five elements of socialist
constitutional identity, while North Korea and Cuba only have moderate
adaption to the constitutional economy. Consequently, the socialist
countries have different models in their reactions to global impact on
their constitutional identity, which can be characterized as constitutional
globalism (Vietnam and Laos); constitutional exceptionalism (China);
constitutional isolationism (North Korea); and constitutional
reservationism (Cuba). These variations are defined by the history of
communism, intellectual environment, the economic condition, the social
structure, the size and population of the respective countries, and the role
of the respective countries in the global economic and political order.
CONCLUSION
This study focuses on the impact of globalization to local
constitutional identity. As the Vietnamese case indicates, socialist
constitutional identity is retained through modification and extension due
to the impact of globalization. I conclude with some general reflections.
The studies on constitutional globalization should go beyond the
consideration of the convergence of rules, institutions, or constitutional
jurisprudence. More fundamental is the globalization of constitutional
ideas and principles. The studies of the causal effects require the balance
between quantitative and qualitative research.
Moreover, this study suggests implications for further studies of
constitutional identity. To begin with, the inquiry into constitutional
identity cannot be limited to constitutionalist polities. If “the concept of
constitutional identity should be at the center of constitutional theory,”371
and the inquiry into constitutional identity is just limited to
369
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constitutionalist systems, it follows that constitutional theory will be
centralized around a limited set of American, European, and a few other
institutional settings that have met basic requirements of
constitutionalism. If this is the case, constitutional theory will ignore a
number of non-constitutionalist constitutional experiences in different
corners of the globe. A polity needs not be constitutionalist to acquire
constitutional identity. Every constitutional system has ideas and
principles fundamental to its existence, which are not simply ignored by
autocrats at will. Moreover, if the condition of constitutional disharmony
is universal, the potential of constitutional identity change is internal to
every constitutional order.
In addition, formal amendments to
constitutional identity should be taken into account. In polities where
judicial review is absent or weak, the evolution of constitutional identity
may be taking place through formal mechanisms like formal
constitutional amendments. Last but not least, global spread of
constitutionalism is an important factor that animates the dynamics of
constitutional identity in non-constitutionalist countries. Therefore, it is
important to study the connection between constitutional globalization
and domestic constitutional identity dynamics.

June 2017

Globalization of Constitutional Identity

535

